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ABSTRACT
In this article, I propose a contextual approach to ICC
jurisdiction normatively to be adopted by the Court’s Office of
the Prosecutor and Pre-Trial Chamber in investigating and
eventually prosecuting crimes under the Rome Statute. Under
this contextual approach, I contend that both the Prosecutor and
Pre-Trial Chamber are able to consider evidence outside the
traditional notions of territorial and temporal jurisdiction to
conceptualize a conflict in its entirety. The totality of crossborder and inter-temporal evidence should be considered when
deciding whether to investigate attacks that the Prosecutor has
a reasonable basis to believe fall within the Court’s jurisdiction.
Procedurally, the multi-step jurisdictional framework, the
“Funnel Approach,”—beginning with the preliminary
examination of a situation and proceeding to issuing an arrest
warrant—provides flexibility to admit extra-jurisdictional
evidence. Textually, the open-ended ‘gravity’ threshold does not
limit the Prosecutor in considering evidence within the Rome
Statute’s territorial or temporal limitations.

* JD (2012) Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada; LLM (2016)
University of California, Berkeley School of Law; Judicial Intern, International
Criminal Court. Many contributions were provided in finalizing this paper.
Thank you to my thesis advisor Jamie O’Connell for his thoughtful insights
and continuous enquiries into how to enhance the herein analysis. This paper
was also presented as part of the “New Voices” panel at the 2016 Annual
Conference of the American Society of International Law. Sincere thanks to
Beth van Scheck, Rebecca Hamilton, Sheri Krebs and Steven Koh for their
feedback.

132

1

HASSAN AHMAD - CONTEXT AT THE ICC (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Context at the ICC

10/27/2017 2:25 PM

133

Table of Contents
I.
II.

Introduction ................................................................... 134
ICC Jurisdiction ............................................................. 143
a. Traditional Notions of Jurisdiction ...................... 143
b. Jurisdiction vs. Admissibility ............................... 147
III. A Contextual Jurisdictional Framework ....................... 151
a. Defining Context................................................... 151
IV. Context Consideration at the Ad Hoc Tribunals ........... 156
V.
Context at the ICC ......................................................... 164
VI. Context and Evidentiary Admissibility ......................... 172
VII. Justifying the Use of Context in the Rome Statute ...... 176
a. Procedural Justification – ‘The Funnel
Approach’ .............................................................. 177
b. Textual Justification – ‘Gravity’ ........................... 182
VIII. Implications of Context Consideration .......................... 186
a. Filling the Impunity Gap...................................... 186
IX. Example: Prosecuting ISIS at the ICC .......................... 189
X.
Criticisms of Expansive Jurisdiction............................. 193
a. Obviating State Sovereignty ................................ 194
b. Legalism vs. Activism ........................................... 196
c. Ambiguity vs. Certainty ....................................... 198
XI. Conclusion ...................................................................... 199

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/3

2

HASSAN AHMAD - CONTEXT AT THE ICC (DO NOT DELETE)

134

PACE INT’L L. REV.

10/27/2017 2:25 PM

[Vol. 29:1

I. Introduction
In his seminal work The Changing Structure of
International Law, Wolfgang Friedmann argued that “it is . . .
possible to work for the strengthening of international law and
authority from the standpoint of ‘enlightened national interest,’
as being the best or even the only way of ensuring national
survival.”1 State actors within the Westphalian system bound by
territorial integrity have, over the 70 years since the end of
World War II, made various efforts to strengthen the
international legal regime.2 One of those methods in recent
decades has been the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or
“Court”).
The ICC has been in existence for about two decades and,
given this timespan, a body of jurisprudence has accumulated.
From the Court’s decisions, patterns can be discerned with
regard to the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. The ICC is a Court
of last resort. Admissibility of a case, therefore, depends on
whether a national legal system is unable or unwilling to
prosecute, and whether the case is of sufficient gravity.3
The Rome Statute (“Statute”) and its supplementary
documents govern the Court.4 Given its complementary

1
WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 48 (1964); see also William Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice:
The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-Level Global
Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 557
(2005) (explaining that the relationship between the International Criminal
Court and the Democratic Republic of Congo exhibited an inter-connected
multi-leveled governance structure whereby the Court altered the DRC’s
domestic politics and strengthened its judiciary).
2 See LESLIE JOHNS, STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COURTS: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF LEGALIZATION (2015) (arguing that a court’s legitimacy and stability
increase with heightened delegation (authority of a third party to adjudicate
disputes) and obligation (normative instrumental pressure to abide by a
ruling)).
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Admissibility of a case is distinct
from the concept of jurisdiction (nationality, subject matter, territorial and
temporal), as discussed in Part II.
4 See, e.g., International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-PIDSLT-03-002/11_Eng. (Sept. 3-10, 2002), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-5BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf
[hereinafter Elements of Crimes]; International Criminal Court, Regulations
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function, the Court’s subject matter is limited to the “most
serious crimes of international concern,”5 including crimes
against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.6
The Court consists of an independent Prosecutor couched
with discretionary powers as to what situations to investigate.7
An investigation into situations is proper where there is a
reasonable basis to believe8 a crime within the Court’s
jurisdiction has occurred. Then, an investigation can be
commenced through a referral made by a State Party,9 a referral
made by the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”),10 or at
the Prosecutor’s own initiative called proprio motu.11 A nonState Party can also confirm jurisdiction through an Article
12(3) Declaration with the caveat that it too, will then be subject
to the Court’s jurisdiction, making its nationals prospectively
subject to prosecution.12
The Statute delineates a multi-step process beginning
with preliminary examinations commenced with either of the
referral mechanisms mentioned above, or by the Prosecutor’s
proprio motu decision,13 formal investigations that require

of the Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04 (May 26, 2004), https://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B920AD62-DF49-4010-8907-E0D8CC61EBA4/277527/
Regulations_of_the_Court_170604EN.pdf [hereinafter Regulations of the
Court].
5 Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl.
6 The Assembly of State Parties agreed upon the coming into force of the
Rome Statute that crimes of aggression would be defined in 2010 at the
Kampala Conference. Article 15 bis now includes definitions of acts of
aggression, and crimes of aggression will come within the Court’s jurisdiction
after 2017. See generally, Harold Koh & Todd Buchwald, The Crime of
Aggression: The United States Perspective, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (2015).
7 Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 15, 53.
8
Id. art. 53(1). For a further discussion on the difference between a
‘situation’ and a ‘case,’ see generally, William A. Schabas, Selecting Cases and
Charging Crimes, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015).
9 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13(a).
10 Id. art. 13(b).
11 Id. art. 15(1).
12 Id. art. 12(3). For an overview of the scope of Article 12(3) Declarations,
see WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 69-72 (2012).
13
See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, Office of The
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authorization by the Pre-Trial Chamber for proprio motu
decisions,14 and the issuance of an arrest warrant when there
are reasonable grounds to believe a crime within the Court’s
jurisdiction has occurred.15 With each subsequent step, the
standard of proof increases. This multi-step process—
irrespective of which method commences a preliminary
examination—is governed by traditional notions of jurisdictional
limitations that are akin to domestic courts.
The Court’s jurisdictional scope is confined temporally,
territorially, by subject matter, and by the person(s) the Court
can prosecute.16 While the ICC mimics aspects of domestic courts
in its jurisdictional limitations, it is a wholly unique court from
those hearing criminal domestic matters and even its
predecessor ad hoc tribunals, such as the International Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg and the Far East, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and
Rwanda (“ICTR”). It is also distinct from the hybrid tribunals,
namely the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) and
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”).17
Each of the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals dealt with a single
conflict and did not include the Statute’s multiple referral
mechanisms. Similarly, none of those tribunals provided the
Prosecutor with discretionary powers as to which situations to
investigate. As such, the possibility of politicization concerning
prosecutorial selection within those tribunals remained low.
Conversely, for the ICC, the Prosecutor or the UNSC has the
ability to choose to investigate or refer, respectively, some

Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT., ¶ 25 (Nov. 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
otp/OTP-Policy_Paper_Preliminary_Examinations_2013-ENG.pdf
[hereinafter Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations].
14 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 15(3).
15 Id. art. 58.
16 For a basic background on the ICC’s jurisdiction, see Philippe Kirsch,
The Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International
Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 539, 542-44 (2007).
17 Id. at 542 (“At the end of 2000, the deadline for signature of the Rome
Statute, 139 States had signed the Statute, which was about twenty more than
those that had voted for the Statute in 1998. To my knowledge, this is a unique
case in the history of a treaty negotiation. Normally what happens is that you
vote for an instrument at the time of the conference because it is easier and
then forget about it because that is also easier.”).
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situations over others. This selectivity is amenable to criticism
based on subjective preferences or, in the case of the UNSC,
national interest.
Distinct from domestic courts, the scale of atrocities, both
in terms of numbers of casualties or level of destruction, is
generally higher at the ICC. Also, the Court typically aims to
prosecute high level political, military, or rebel leaders who may
be immune, whether legally or de facto, from prosecution in
domestic courts. Moreover, the subject matter within the ICC’s
jurisdiction is more political in nature. Few would oppose the
contention that there are little geopolitical ramifications of
prosecuting individual incidents of theft, rape, or even murder
at the domestic level. However, when these crimes are
committed on a large scale by criminal enterprises that are
formed either from the State (as in Kenya, Sudan, or Libya) or
from organized rebel groups opposing the State (as in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo or Cote D’Ivoire) and
implicate intra and/or international relations, a political
element arises. In this regard, the Court’s decisions delve into a
State’s affairs and power structures and, at times, bring to light
histories of oppression and injustice.18
The purpose of this paper is to argue that while the four
jurisdictional limitations mentioned above remain necessary to
delineate the boundaries of cases that can proceed through
preliminary examinations and investigations, it is possible to
expand these limitations by considering the historical and
political context of a particular conflict. By expanding
18 See also John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y for Arms Control and Int’l Sec.,
Remarks to the Federalist Society: The United States and the International
Criminal Court (Nov. 14, 2002), https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158
.htm (“The Court’s flaws are basically two-fold, substantive, and structural. As
to the former, the ICC’s authority is vague and excessively elastic, and the
Court’s discretion ranges far beyond normal or acceptable judicial
responsibilities, giving it broad and unacceptable powers of interpretation that
are essentially political and legislative in nature. This is most emphatically not
a Court of limited jurisdiction. Crimes can be added subsequently that go
beyond those included in the Rome Statute. Parties to the Statute are subject
to these subsequently-added crimes only if they affirmatively accept them, but
the Statute purports automatically to bind non-parties, such as the United
States, to any such new crimes. It is neither reasonable nor fair that these
crimes would apply to a greater extent to states that have not agreed to the
terms of the Rome Statute than to those that have.”).
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jurisdictional limitations to aggregate information at the
preliminary examination and investigation phases, the Court
could achieve the gravity threshold in cases where it would not
have done so previously. This article elaborates upon this
expansive approach in more detail in Parts II and III.
The terminology of ‘expanding’ jurisdiction, instead of
‘changing’ jurisdiction, is used because, as will be outlined in
detail below, in order for the herein argument to apply, the Court
will require at least one of the bases of its jurisdiction to be met
before jurisdiction can be expanded. In this regard, this article
does not argue that the Court should change its jurisdiction as
established in the Statute. It does not argue that the Court
should amend the Statute in any way. It only argues that in the
midst of a single conflict, where information exists from attacks
taking place outside the Court’s traditional jurisdiction, the
Court should be able to consider that information. By
considering information in the aggregate—whether from inside
or outside the Court’s traditional jurisdiction—situations and
cases could come before the Court that would otherwise be
excluded. This, in turn, will fill the impunity gap—a concept
elaborated upon throughout this paper.
Can the Court use contextual factors outside its strict
notions of jurisdiction to prosecute ISIS? According to the
Prosecutor’s April 8, 2015 Statement, the answer is no. The
Prosecutor conceded that the Court does not have territorial
jurisdiction because Iraq and Syria—where the majority of
attacks have taken place—are not State Parties. The Prosecutor
also emphasized that while there would be jurisdiction over
State Party nationals who have traveled to Syria and Iraq to
fight with ISIS, the terror group is “primarily led by nationals of
Iraq and Syria.”19 Therefore, in addition to not having territorial
jurisdiction, the Court also lacked nationality jurisdiction.

Press Release, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the alleged crimes committed by ISIS,
INT’L CRIM. CT. (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name
=otp-stat-08-04-2015-1 (“The information gathered indicates that several
thousand foreign fighters have joined the ranks of ISIS in the past months
alone, including significant numbers of State Party nationals from, inter alia,
Tunisia, Jordan, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Australia.”) [ISIS Statement].
19
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The argument this article wishes to assert is that
aggregating information from attacks in both State and nonState Party territories to reach the requisite gravity threshold
would allow the Prosecutor to pursue ISIS leadership, even
though they are non-State Party nationals. ISIS attacks within
the same conflict have occurred on both State Party (France20
and Brussels21) and non-State Party (Syria, Iraq, and Turkey)
territories. Evidence from all these attacks should be aggregated
to meet the gravity threshold and bring ISIS leadership under
the Court’s jurisdiction. This article advocates that the Court
need only to expand its notions of temporal and territorial
jurisdiction to close the impunity gap consisting of matters that
i) are neither prosecuted by State Parties nor the Court or,
otherwise, ii) are not prosecuted by non-State Parties where the
Court cannot exert its complementary jurisdiction. This
approach has been practiced, although inconsistently, by the ad
hoc tribunals and, in select situations, before the ICC. The ISIS
example is delved into later in the paper.
A broader and more expansive approach to temporal and
territorial jurisdiction that casts a wide net when relevant
probative evidence is considered is necessary given the
increasingly cross-border nature of contemporary conflicts.
These conflicts, at times, may not fit within the strict
jurisdictional boundaries envisioned by the Statute. State Party
territories border non-State Party territories even though
attacks within the same ongoing conflict permeate borders
separating these territories. A broader jurisdictional approach
that is not limited to traditional notions of territoriality and
temporality will lead to more situations that fall within the
Court’s ambit, thereby narrowing the impunity gap.
Throughout this paper, I will limit my argument in favour of
jurisdictional expansion to the preliminary examination,

20 Anne Barnard & Hwaida Saad, ISIS Claims Responsibility for Blasts
that Killed Dozens in Beirut, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/11/13/world/middleeast/lebanon-explosions-southern-beiruthezbollah.html.
21 Alissa J. Rubin, Aurelien Breeden & Anita Raghavan, Strikes Claimed
by ISIS Shut Brussels and Shake European Security, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/europe/brussels-airportexplosions.html?_r=0.
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investigation, and authorization stages, because these stages
comprise the framework for analyzing when and how a situation
comes within the Court’s jurisdiction.
Analyzing the potential use of context in determining the
Court’s jurisdiction has become pertinent following a referral
made by the Union of Comoros (“Comoros”) pursuant to an
attack in May 2010 aboard the MV Mari Marmara, a vessel
registered to Comoros and delivering humanitarian aid to the
Gaza Strip.22 After the Prosecutor deemed the matter to be of
insufficient gravity to warrant formal investigation by the
Court,23 Comoros brought an application to the Pre-Trial
Chamber to request the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision.24
While the Pre-Trial Chamber granted the request and asked the
Prosecutor to reconsider her decision not to investigate on the
ground that the decision to investigate occupies the lowest
evidentiary threshold of a “reasonable basis to proceed,”25 one of
Comoros’s arguments not considered in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
decision was that the underlying political context of the Israeli-

22 The facts leading to the referral in the situation in Comoros are fairly
straight-forward and not necessarily contested. The vessel was surrounded by
Israeli Defence Forces’ (“IDF”) helicopters with IDF soldiers firing bullets upon
the ship. IDF soldiers also landed on the ship. The incident resulted in 10
deaths and numerous others injured. See Situation on the Registered Vessels
of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of
Cambodia, Case No. ICC-01/13-34, Decision on the request of the Union of the
Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, at
3 (July 16, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR 2015_13139.PDF.
23
Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia
Article 53(1) Report, Office of the Prosecutor, ¶ 151 (Int’l Crim. Ct. Nov. 6,
2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-com-article_53(1)-report-06nov
2014eng.pdf.
24
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 53(3); see Situation on Registered
Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic of Greece and the
Kingdom of Cambodia, Case No. ICC-01/13-3-Red, Application for Review
Pursuant to Article 53(3)(a) of the Prosecutor’s Decision of 6 November 2014
not to initiate an investigation in the Situation, ¶ 1 (Jan. 29, 2015), https://
www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_00576.PDF [Comoros Application].
25
In the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, the Pre-Trial Chamber
stated that the ‘reasonable basis to believe’ test stated in Article 53(1)(a) is the
lowest evidentiary standard found in the Statute. See Situation in the Republic
of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Kenya, ¶ 27 (Mar. 31, 2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Court
Records/CR2010_02399.PDF.
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Palestinian conflict and the existing blockade on the Gaza Strip
made any and all subsequent acts that could reasonably be
crimes, inter alia, within the Court’s jurisdiction. Comoros’s
lawyers argued in their brief:
“[T]he wider occupation/conflict and the blockade are preconditions to the exercise of the Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and the necessary contextual requirements for the
conduct on board the vessels (over which the Court has
territorial and temporal jurisdiction) to be charged as war
crimes at the ICC. . . . Acts occurring outside of the territorial
and temporal jurisdiction of the Court can certainly be taken
into account when considering whether the Court can exercise
jurisdiction over conduct which is within its territorial and
temporal jurisdiction and in order better to understand and to
characterise such conduct.”26

Comoros’s argument was that the Court should consider the
wider context of the blockade and occupation over the
Palestinian territories as part of its gravity analysis. In other
words, Comoros was requesting the Court to consider
information outside its strict notion of territorial jurisdiction, as
Palestine was not a State Party at the time. Such consideration
would militate in favour of concluding that a reasonable basis to
believe that crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have
occurred. As this article will argue, the Office of the Prosecutor
(“OTP”), and the Pre-Trial Chamber when authorization is
required, can and should aggregate evidence from inside and
outside their strict notions of territorial and temporal
jurisdiction when such evidence regards the same conflict. This
aggregate approach should be taken when an alternatively
truncated approach considering only evidence within the Court’s
territorial and temporal jurisdiction would not fulfill the
requisite gravity threshold. A more detailed account of the
Situation in Comoros27 is provided later in the paper.

Comoros Application, supra note 24, at 8.
The Prosecutor appealed the Pre-Trial Chambers decision requesting
her to reconsider the decision to not investigate. The Appeals Chamber
dismissed the appeal in limine on the grounds that decisions of admissibility
are not appealable under Article 82(1). See Situation on Registered Vessels of
26
27
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This paper proceeds in six subsequent parts. Part II
outlines the jurisdictional regime as it currently stands within
the Statute. While the article outlines all bases for jurisdiction,
I specify that my argument for a full contextual analysis will be
confined to territorial and temporal jurisdiction. That part ends
with a salient discussion on the distinction between jurisdiction
and admissibility and, perhaps more importantly, on the
limitations of the herein contextual approach. I specifically
outline that a matter will have to fall under, at least, one of the
four traditional notions of the Court’s jurisdiction for a
contextual approach to apply. Any argument for expanding
jurisdiction that does not exist in the first place is moot.
Part III presents my idea of Context. While the herein
approach to expanding jurisdiction may be conceptualized as
considering “political” context, taking into account the history of
inter and intra-national relations, external hegemonic forces,
colonialist history, and ethnic and religious divides, among
others, I steer clear of the term “political” given the complex and
nuanced philosophical underpinnings that render that term’s
numerous subjective connotations.28 The section then proceeds
through decisions by both the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals and
the ICC in which contextual factors were considered as an
evidentiary matter when determining whether to issue an arrest
warrant or convict the accused.
While my advocacy for a contextual approach focuses on
the ICC’s initial assertion of jurisdiction by the OTP and the PreTrial Chamber, previous decisions—at albeit different stages of
the litigation process—illustrate that the tribunals and Court
are able to account for evidence outside the traditional
boundaries of temporal and territorial jurisdiction. Part IV
the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s
appeal against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to
review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation” (Nov. 6, 2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_20965.PDF.
28 This contention concerning the difficulty in defining the term “political”
is also expressed in Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive
Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 266-67
(2012) (“Most recently, some authors have suggested that the prosecutor’s role
is inevitably political and should be acknowledged as such. The participants in
this debate rarely define what they mean by ‘political. . .’”).

11
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builds on the decisions cited in Part III by conceptualizing a
contextual approach as an evidentiary enquiry in which the
focus should be on the relevance and probity of collected
information falling outside traditional territorial and temporal
parameters.
Part V delves into the justifications for Context
consideration. I divide that part into procedural and textual
justifications. Procedurally, I argue that the ICC’s multi-step
prosecutorial process, which I term the Funnel Approach,
provides a relatively open-ended evidentiary scope to the OTP
and Pre-Trial Chamber to consider Context. Textually, I argue
that the gravity analysis is intentionally ambiguous so as to
provide a flexible and fluid approach to asserting jurisdiction.
Part VI proceeds through various implications of Context
consideration. I argue that Context must be taken into account
to effectively close the impunity gap between i) State Parties
unwilling or unable to prosecute a situation; and ii) non-State
Parties that do not fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. I also
address criticisms that may arise to a contextual approach to
jurisdiction, such as impinging State sovereignty, turning the
Court’s members into a group of activists rather than objective
and sober legal determinists, and the prospect of adding
unwanted ambiguity into the jurisdictional analysis. Part VI
goes through a practical example of prosecuting ISIS at the ICC.
Part VII concludes this paper.
II. ICC Jurisdiction
a. Traditional Notions of Jurisdiction
The Rome Statute outlines the four bases of temporal,
nationality, territorial, and subject matter jurisdiction in
various provisions.29 Temporally, the Court’s jurisdiction applies
29 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 11-13, 22. Nationality jurisdiction
differs from personal jurisdiction in the domestic context. Whereas Article
12(2)(b) of the Rome Statute confers jurisdiction over “[t]he State of which the
person accused of the crime is a national,” personal jurisdiction in the domestic
context is a person or organization’s physical presence within a State’s
territory or, otherwise, its ‘minimum contacts’ with that State. See Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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only after the Statute enters into force, which is July 1, 2002.30
For parties signing after that date, the Statute enters into force
from the date the State Party signed it.31 Furthermore, there is
no criminal responsibility “unless the conduct in question
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court.”32 This applies particularly to crimes of
aggression, which are not within the Court’s jurisdiction until at
least 2017.33 Therefore, acts constituting the elements of a crime
of aggression committed before 2017 cannot be investigated and
prosecuted by the Court unless those same acts are initiated
again or, otherwise, continue after 2017. The bar to retroactivity
under the Statute (other than Article 12(3) Declarations) differs
from the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”)
conception, which allows for prosecution of crimes retroactively
when those crimes are both accessible and reasonably
foreseeable by an offender.34
Under nationality jurisdiction, the Court is limited to
prosecuting nationals of a State Party. For Article 12(3)
Declarations or UNSC referrals where the Court’s jurisdiction
extends to non-State Party territories, the Court has jurisdiction
over nationals from those territories. The ICC does not recognize
immunity ratione personae for crimes committed by sitting or
former heads of state.35 While the Court can assert jurisdiction
over nationals committing crimes on non-State Party territories,

Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 11(1).
Id. art. 11(2). Under Article 11(2), there is an exception for declarations
made under Article 12(3) for non-State Parties. For Article 12(3) declarations,
the Statute applies retroactively. Article 11(2) states, “[i]f a State becomes a
Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of
this Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration under
article 12, paragraph 3.” (emphasis added).
32 Id. art. 22(1).
33 See Koh & Buchwald, supra note 6, at 257.
34 See Schabas, supra note 12, at 74 (citing SW v. United Kingdom, 355B Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 35-36 (1996); CR v. United Kingdom, 335-B Eur. Ct.
H.R. paras. 33-34 (1995); Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2010).
35
Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International
Criminal Court, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407 (2004) (“[I]mmunity ratione materiae
does not exist with respect to domestic criminal proceedings for any of the
international crimes set out in the Statute of the ICC.”).
30
31
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the Prosecutor retains discretion whether to pursue those
nationals if, in her opinion, they play subordinate or minor roles
within a criminal organization. This appears to be the
Prosecutor’s approach to State Party nationals committing
crimes in Iraq and Syria as part of ISIS, as discussed above.
The ICC has territorial jurisdiction over crimes
committed on the territory of a State Party regardless of the
offender’s nationality.36 The Court also has jurisdiction over
crimes committed on the territory of States accepting
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis as well as through UNSC
referrals.37 The exception to the general rule for territorial
jurisdiction exists under Article 121(5), adopted in the 2010
Conference, whereby State Parties that have not accepted that
amendment are not subject to its jurisdiction. Under territorial
jurisdiction, the Statute also includes crimes committed on
board vessels or aircrafts registered to a State Party, which is
why Comoros was able to refer a case to the Court as the MV
Mavi Marmara is considered an extension of its territorial
boundaries.
For the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and crimes of aggression falling within the Court’s
jurisdiction, each crime is outlined in the Statute,38 and
supplemented by the accompanying Elements of Crimes.39 By
and large, the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is adopted from
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after World War II where
the crimes were referred to as crimes against peace, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity.40 Although the term ‘genocide’
had already been coined at the time of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials, the indictments against Nazi perpetrators for the crimes
against European Jews were argued under crimes against
humanity.41
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 12(2)(a).
Id. art. 13(b).
38 Id. arts. 6-8.
39 Elements of Crimes, supra note 4.
40
See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military
Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter].
41 Schabas, supra note 12, at 90-91.
36
37
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As mentioned above, the argument for expanding
jurisdictional scope will herein be limited to temporal and
territorial jurisdiction. The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is
defined and limited to the four crimes mentioned in the Statute.
Also, its limitations on nationality jurisdiction leave little space
for ambiguity, as it is a question of fact whether someone is or is
not a national of a particular country. Conversely, relevant and
probative information can be considered from both inside and
outside the Court’s temporal and territorial jurisdiction in the
midst of the same conflict to determine which situations should
be investigated.
Particularly with territorial jurisdiction, there exists an
asymmetry between where conflicts occur and where the Court
can exercise its jurisdiction. In other words, modern conflicts
inevitably permeate across State borders. Conflicts often times
take place in areas where a State Party to the Court borders a
non-State Party(ies).42 Consequentially, the Court is unable to
consider the entirety of a situation due to its limitations to
investigate only within the territory of a State Party. Take, for
instance, conflicts occurring in the Middle East or parts of
Africa. While Palestine is a State Party after its conferral as an
observer State at the UN General Assembly,43 Israel is not a
State Party; while Jordan is a State Party, Iraq and Syria are
not State Parties; while Kenya is a State Party, Somalia is not;
while Chad is a State Party, Libya and Egypt are not. The porous
nature of intra and inter-State conflicts obviates the Statute’s
ability to effectively and adequately investigate those situations
that fall within its jurisdiction by trimming its investigative and
prosecutorial scope only to those situations that fall strictly
within its traditional notions of territorial and temporal
jurisdiction.
While a situation may fall within the Court’s jurisdiction
pursuant to an attack occurring within the territory of a State
42 A related example concerns transnational conflicts where combatants
of a State Party commit crimes on the territory of a non-State Party, e.g.
British forces committing alleged war crimes in Iraq. See HÉCTOR OLASOLO,
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33 (2012).
43 State Parties to the Rome Statute: Asia-Pacific States, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/asian%20states/
Pages/asian%20states.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
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Party, the Court will be forced to neglect, at times, a plethora of
relevant information that may be necessary for it to meet the
gravity threshold necessary to continue with the prosecutorial
process. Gravity determinations initially inhibited an
investigation from commencing for alleged war crimes in Iraq by
British forces.44 Nonetheless, after reconsidering, the OTP has
subsequently decided to investigate.45
b. Jurisdiction vs. Admissibility
As a final note to the jurisdictional framework as it
currently stands in the Statute, both the concept and analysis of
jurisdiction (under the four rubrics discussed above) are distinct
from the admissibility of a case or situation. Whereas
jurisdiction is a threshold determination, admissibility is
considered after jurisdiction has been established and can
negate the prospect of a situation reaching the Court even
though it falls within the Court’s jurisdiction. Under Article 17,
the admissibility analysis considers whether a case under the
Court’s jurisdiction is or has been investigated or prosecuted in
a national jurisdiction, whether prosecution would amount to res
judicata, or, otherwise, whether the case is of sufficient
‘gravity.’46 Similarly, under Article 53, the Prosecutor can decide
not to initiate an investigation taking into account Article 17
factors or by using lack of gravity to conclude that an
investigation would not be in the interests of justice. In sum,
admissibility can negate the finding of prima facie jurisdiction.

44 Letters to Senders re Iraq, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT., 2
n.4 (Feb. 9, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FD042F2E-678E-4E
C6-8121-690BE61D0B5A/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February
_2007.pdf (“[T]aking into account all the [gravity] considerations, the situation
did not appear to meet the required threshold of the Statute.”).
45 Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-opens the preliminary examination of the situation
in Iraq (May 13, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otpstatement-iraq-13-05-2014.
46 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17, 20(3). For an overview of the
distinction between admissibility and jurisdiction, see Markus Benzing, The
Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: International
Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity, 7
UNYB 591, 594 (2003).
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Throughout this paper, it will be advocated that the OTP
and Pre-Trial Chamber may consider relevant and probative
information outside territorial and temporal jurisdictional
boundaries to bolster the admissibility criterion of gravity. As
stated, the Statute contains separate enquiries for jurisdiction
and admissibility. Jurisdiction considers where, when, why, and
to and by whom attacks were committed. It is a preliminary
enquiry separate and apart from the admissibility requirements
outlined in Article 17 for a particular case and in Article 53 for
the initiation of an investigation into a situation.
Admissibility—specifically, whether a State Party is prosecuting
a matter or whether it reaches the gravity threshold—is only
considered once one of the four bases for jurisdiction outlined
above is fulfilled.
As just stated, the herein argument only applies in
situations where one of the four bases for jurisdiction has been
fulfilled. If jurisdiction is not established, the Court cannot
consider contextual factors. Only when either nationality,
subject matter, territorial, or temporal jurisdiction exists can the
Court expand that jurisdiction. This paper advocates for the
permissibility of expanding territorial and/or temporal
jurisdiction once one basis for jurisdiction is established.
Currently, statutory limitations exist for both temporal
and territorial jurisdiction, as outlined at the beginning of this
section. Temporally, the Statute only applies after July 2002.
Territorially, the Statute is limited to State Parties, or,
otherwise, its nationals in non-State Party territories. I argue
here that the Court can expand territorial and/or temporal
jurisdiction at the preliminary examination and investigation
stages to consider contextual information temporally from before
July 2002, or territorially from attacks on non-State Party
territories committed by non-State Party nationals. This
information from outside the Court’s traditional jurisdiction can
then be aggregated with information from attacks within the
Court’s traditional temporal and territorial jurisdiction. That
information can then be used in the aggregate to reach the
gravity threshold required for admissibility under Articles 17
and 53.
Two caveats exist to the herein approach to expanding
jurisdiction to meet the gravity threshold. First, the information
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considered from both inside and outside the Court’s traditional
temporal and territorial jurisdiction must relate to the same
conflict. The cross-border nature of conflicts has led to attacks
being perpetrated in various states and at various times. Some
of these attacks may fall within the Court’s traditional temporal
or territorial jurisdiction, and others may not. Second, the
contextual aggregate approach to information collection is only
used when staying within the Court’s traditional temporal and
territorial jurisdiction would not itself meet the gravity
threshold. For instance, in the flotilla attack, gravity may not
have been met when looking at the attack on its own even
though it fell within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction. There is
permission under the Statute, as Comoros argued, for the Court
to consider information from within the Gaza Strip, which was
not under the Court’s territorial jurisdiction at the time of the
attack. Aggregating information from attacks on the flotilla
(inside the Court’s territorial jurisdiction) with information from
attacks on the Palestinian territories (outside the Court’s
territorial jurisdiction) would assist in meeting the gravity
threshold. It is arguable whether the gravity threshold would be
met by considering the flotilla attack in isolation—given the
relatively low number of casualties resulting from the attack.
For this example, the expansive aggregate approach to
information collection would serve as a basis to potentially
prosecute Israeli officials who would not otherwise come within
the Court’s jurisdiction, as Israel is not a State Party.
To further elaborate, it is mandatory that one of the four
traditional bases of jurisdiction is present before a contextual
approach is employed. In this vein, I do not argue that a matter
of high gravity (i.e. resulting in many casualties or
infrastructural destruction) can come before the Court when the
traditional requirements of the four bases of jurisdiction as laid
out in the Statute have not been met. A heinous attack killing
hundreds or thousands of people completely within the territory
of a non-State Party in the midst of a conflict with no direct or
indirect effects on the territory of a State Party and with no
involvement from State Parties’ nationals would not fall within
the Court’s jurisdiction. As such, a contextual approach could
not be taken. In the next part of this paper, I outline five

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol29/iss1/3
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requirements for the application of a contextual approach to
cross-border conflicts.
As stated in the introduction, the herein argument is
limited to expanding, not changing, the Court’s established
bases for jurisdiction. Asserting jurisdiction regardless of the
nationality and territory of the accused and attack, respectively,
would amount to universal jurisdiction—a concept for which
there is no basis in the Statute.47 Nonetheless, from the
examples outlined in Part III, the notion of an exclusively
domestic conflict is becoming less common. The increasing norm
is cross-border conflicts where attacks within the same conflict
are perpetrated in various places and over a prolonged period of
time. As such, it is necessary to apply a contextual approach to
expand the ICC’s jurisdiction to account for these trans-border
conflicts and prosecute non-State Party nationals who are
leading criminal organizations from non-State Party territories.
To conclude this discussion on the distinction between
jurisdiction and admissibility in light of the requirements and
caveats presented above, I lay out five criteria that must be
fulfilled to proceed with an investigation under an expansive
contextual approach aggregating information from inside and
outside the Court’s temporal and territorial jurisdiction. The five
criteria are as follows:
1. Attacks by the same organization, whether directly by its
leadership or (more likely) through its subordinates, would
occur on the territories of both State and non-State Party
territories;
2. The organization’s leadership would reside in the territory
of a non-State Party and be nationals of a non-State Party;
3. The attacks on State Party territories, taken in isolation,
would not reach the gravity threshold;

47
Kirsch, supra note 16, at 542 (“The ICC does not have universal
jurisdiction.”); see also Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal
Jurisdiction: The Political Branches And The Transnational Prosecution Of
International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2011) (“Unlike the regime of
international criminal tribunals created by the United Nations Security
Council and the enforcement regime of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
the regime of universal jurisdiction is completely decentralized.”).
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4. Aggregating the casualties and/or effects of the attacks by
the organization on State and non-State Party territories
would fulfill the gravity threshold; and
5. The State Party would be unable or unwilling to prosecute
the perpetrators of attacks on its territory.

Each of the above five criteria must be fulfilled
independently for the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber to consider
information outside its temporal and territorial jurisdiction
during the preliminary examination and investigation stages. If
even one of the above factual enquiries is not fulfilled, then the
herein argument does not apply. Part III below specifically
defines Context and its significance. That part then proceeds
through previous decisions by both the ad hoc tribunals and the
ICC where evidence—albeit at times in later stages of the
prosecutorial process—was considered outside the Court’s
temporal or territorial jurisdiction.
III. A Contextual Jurisdictional Framework
a. Defining Context
As alluded to above, the ICC is distinct from its domestic
and ad hoc / hybrid predecessors in that its prosecutorial
discretion function and ability to consider large scale crimes
perpetrated either by a State’s government or forces opposing
the government inherently politicize its proceedings. State
actors, whether as perpetrators or recipients of armed attacks,
have and will play heavily into cases before the ICC. As BurkeWhite notes, the DRC’s self-referral to the Court functioned “as
a politically expedient solution for the Congolese president to
deal with potential electoral rivals. . .”48 The interaction between
the Court and domestic political systems comes in various forms,
either through the State referral system or, otherwise, the
requirement to cooperate with the Court’s proceedings.49
The Court is not only subject to a referral from a State
Party, but also from the UNSC, a committee of permanent and

48
49

Burke-White, supra note 1, at 559.
See generally Rome Statute, supra note 3, at Part IX.
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rotating States. Moreover, as a matter proceeds through its
prosecutorial process, ICC judges are required to assess political
concepts, such as diplomatic immunity, military command, the
right to self-determination, and the responsibility to protect.
While these topics may arise (although rarely) in domestic
prosecutions, the ICC serves as an outside body whose
jurisdiction only exists due to a State’s consent by treaty or,
otherwise, as a result of a UNSC referral foisting jurisdiction
upon a State. In that light, the ICC essentially imposes its
jurisdiction over a State’s sovereignty and this may be done, at
times, while conflicts in other States are not being investigated
or prosecuted.50 This permanent function, as opposed to the ad
hoc nature of the predecessor tribunals, renders the ICC a
unique Court that must remain loyal to its mandate to prosecute
crimes within its jurisdiction while simultaneously relying on
individual States to fulfill their duties and responsibilities
triggered upon signing the Statute.
While the contention of this article is that the ICC should
aggregate information both from inside and outside its
traditional notions of territorial and temporal jurisdiction, I
remain hesitant to characterize this expansive approach as
considering “political” context. Politics as social order and
societal classification finds its roots in Aristotelian thought,
which essentialised political order from the family structure all
the way up to a State’s relation to its subjects. The term “politics”
itself has deep historical roots with varied interpretations and
iterations as diverse as Mill’s harm theory, Machiavelli’s
separation of morality and the science of politics, and Locke’s
rights-based approach to politics leading to the Rawlsian
conception of a liberal State. Given the historical complexity of
the term “politics” vis-à-vis its narrative of State-to-State or
State-to-citizen relations, I advocate for the ICC to expand its
information gathering approach by stretching the boundaries of,
specifically, territorial and temporal jurisdiction. I will simply
See deGuzman, supra note 28, at 276 (“The ICC currently suffers from
low purposive legitimacy—it lacks both a defined community to which it is
responsible and accepted values or goals associated with its work. The ICC’s
deficiencies in these regards distinguish it from national courts and explain
why it is more important for the ICC to articulate acceptable justifications for
its selection decisions than it is for national courts to do so.”).
50
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refer to this concept going forward as Context. This can be
illustrated through the following formula:
Context (in relation to a particular conflict)
=
Relevant and probative information inside and outside the
geographical boundaries of a State Party
+
Relevant and probative information prior to and after the
ratification of the Rome Statute

The consideration of Context, whether by the OTP or PreTrial Chamber (for authorizations of proprio motu decisions),
when deciding whether to assert jurisdiction is significant for
three reasons. First, the prevalence of cross-border armed
conflicts in conjunction with the reality that not all States have
ratified the Statute means that there will exist conflicts where,
according to the strict parameters of the Statute, a portion of
attacks will fall within the Statute’s territorial jurisdiction while
other attacks will not—even though those attacks may be
committed by the same entity in the midst of the same conflict.
As Moir notes, the traditional dichotomy in the law of war
between international (State versus State) and noninternational (State versus rebel group) armed conflicts is
breaking down. Modern warfare often consists of State versus
rebel conflicts that transcend national borders.51 This is
exemplified by the U.S. war on terror against Al-Qaeda post9/11, and the current ongoing conflict between Western and
Middle Eastern States against ISIS.
The proliferation of non-State actors over the past fifty
years has increased cross-border conflicts. Previous conflicts
between State and non-State actors tended to stay within the
boundaries of a single State. This is illustrated in the conflict
between the Nicaraguan government and the Contras, or
between the South Vietnamese Government and the National
Liberation Front (Viet Cong). However, contemporary conflicts

51 Lindsay Moir, ‘It’s a Bird! It’s a Plane! It’s a Non-International Armed
Conflict!’: Cross-Border Hostilities Between States and Non-State Actors, in
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF WAR 71-94 (2014).
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do not respect State boundaries as in the past. Conflicts now
expand across regions, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army’s
conflict with Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African
Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some
conflicts even transcend continents, as exemplified by ISIS’s
attacks in various parts of the Middle East, West Africa, and
Western Europe. The increasing normalcy of cross-border
conflicts across nations that are State or non-State Parties
makes the requirement of considering Context necessary.
The second significant reason for Context relates to the
first - the emergence in many armed conflicts of non-State actors
that do not adhere to the traditional laws of war.52 Organized
rebel groups, such as ISIS and Boko Haram, are not only
conflating traditional territorial borders, but also launching
attacks in multiple countries across a prolonged timespan
without a firm declaration of war. In conjunction with AlShabab, another terrorist organization, Boko Haram, has
launched offensives in parts of Kenya and Nigeria, both State
Parties, while operating out of parts of Somalia, a non-State
Party.53 Any potential prosecution of either Boko Haram or AlShabab members can and should be considered in the territorial
aggregate when the OTP engages in its analysis of whether to
commence an investigation. Bifurcating Boko Haram and Al52 Non-state actors are bound by International Humanitarian Law as a
matter of customary international law and by virtue of the citizenship of their
members in States Parties to the relevant treaties. See Jelena Pejic, The
Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye, 93 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 189, 202 (2011) (“There is no substantive reason why the norms
that apply to an armed conflict between a state and an organized armed group
within its territory should not also apply to an armed conflict with such a group
that is not restricted to its territory. It therefore seems . . . that to the extent
that treaty provisions relating to non-international armed conflicts incorporate
standards of customary international law, these standards should apply to all
armed conflicts between a state and non-state actors. This means that, at the
very least, Common Article 3 will apply to such conflicts.”) (quoting David
Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions
or Legitimate Means of Defence? 16 EUR. J INT’L LAW 171, 195 (2005)).
53 Murithi Mutiga, Are the Terrorists of Al-Shabaab about to Tear Kenya
in Two?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2015, 12:16 PM), http://www.theguardian
.com/world/2015/apr/04/kenya-university-massacre-shabaab-divisions (“There
have been media reports of collaboration in terms of training and exchanging
ideas between Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, but it is essential to study the
Shabaab’s aims in greater detail to see what their goals are.”)
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Shabab’s activities in East Africa according to strict territorial
limits obviates a full evidentiary analysis where the complete
intensity and scope of the attacks, and the depth of their
organization and planning, will not be considered.
The third significant reason to implement Context when
assessing jurisdiction is that innovative technologies have
altered the manner of modern warfare. Such technologies are
less constrained by geographical boundaries and, likewise, do
not fall within the traditional characterization of an attack
occurring at a specific time. Technological advancement has
resulted in new tactics, such as cyber-attacks and drones. Both
of these mechanisms lack territorial specificity (although drones
can be controlled to a greater extent), and with cyber-attacks, it
can be debated when an attack actually commences.54 The
current territorial and temporal constraints imposed by the
Statute do not suffice in accounting for these new technologies.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper, efforts such as the
Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare are attempting to address the various technological
advancements in contemporary conflicts.55
The three factors outlined above signify the continually
changing structure of international criminal law and the law of
war. The Court has not achieved universal acceptance to date
(especially in high conflict regions), and the actors and means
involved in modern warfare are rapidly changing such that the
international legal framework has not been able to follow suit.
The following decisions, from both the ad hoc tribunals and the
ICC, illustrate instances where judges have accounted for
evidence presented by the prosecution extending beyond the
statutory temporal and territorial limitations.

54 For an example of submissions at the ICC in relation to cyber-attacks,
see Peter Micek, Evidence of Communications Disruptions re: Investigation of
Central African Republic for Crimes Against Humanity, ACCESS (Feb. 13,
2014), https://www.accessnow.org/evidence-international-criminal-court-netshutdown-in-central-african-repub/.
55
TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt, ed., 2013).
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Context Consideration at the Ad Hoc Tribunals

As mentioned above, the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals are
distinct from the ICC in that the former do not have referral
mechanisms and are limited to a specific conflict. They are not
permanent courts, and are arguably not committed to building a
coherent and consistent policy when considering evidence and
deciding what situations are ultimately to come within their
jurisdiction. The decisions below concern evidentiary findings
and, particularly, the admissibility of evidence outside statutory
temporal and territorial limitations. The preliminary
evidentiary issues in these decisions do not concern whether the
case is properly before the tribunal. The accused has already
been arrested and is before the tribunal. Rather, the legal
questions pertain to the evidentiary scope to be considered when
determining whether crimes within the tribunal’s jurisdiction
have occurred. Conversely, in the ICC decisions also discussed
below, questions concerning the Court’s jurisdiction over a
particular situation or an accused—whether to commence an
investigation or issue an arrest warrant—were at issue.
i. Nahimana (ICTR)
Ferdinand Nahimana was a Rwandan historian and
founder of the radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille
Collines. At the ICTR, it was alleged that in 1993, he carried out
acts inciting genocide that continued until 1994 when the
physical acts constituting the Rwandan genocide occurred. As
the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction began from January 1, 1994,56
the defence argued that Nahimana’s comments before that date
fell outside the ICTR’s jurisdiction. They also argued that the
incitement to genocide was not a crime that continued to run
from the moment the comments were uttered until the time the
acts of genocide were committed in 1994. The Prosecutor, on the
other hand, argued that “[l]ogically, matters which go towards
proof of events happening in 1994 may antedate 1994,”57 and
S.C. Res. 955, art. 7 (Nov. 8, 1994).
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgment,
¶ 304 (Nov. 28 2007), http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/
56
57
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unless the ICTR Statute expressly prohibited the reception of
evidence before 1994, the evidence should be admissible.58 The
Prosecutor contended that the defence confused the concepts of
jurisdiction and admissibility,59 with the latter being the means
the Tribunal can use to decide the former.60 The Prosecutor also
argued that Nahimana’s comments pre-dating the Tribunal’s
temporal jurisdiction would be used to establish his mens rea.
The Appeals Chamber relied on the strict wording of
Article 7 of the ICTR Statute and the comments made in a 1995
UN Secretary General Report61 in concluding that the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction would be limited to crimes commenced and
concluded in 1994. The Appeals Chambers, however, did accede
to the Prosecutor’s argument that evidence pre-1994 was
admissible if it was relevant, of probative value, and there was
no compelling reason to exclude it. The Appeals Chamber held
that the pre-1994 evidence, to be admitted, should i) be aimed at
clarifying a given context, ii) establish by inference the elements
of criminal conduct occurring in 1994 or iii) demonstrate a
deliberate pattern of conduct.62 The Appeals Chamber concluded
that the Trial Chamber did not exceed its jurisdiction or breach
trial fairness by relying on pre-1994 evidence.63
The Appeals Chamber decision also discussed whether
direct and public incitement to genocide occurring pre-1994 was
NAHIMANA%20ET%20AL%20-%20APPEALS%20JUDGEMENT.pdf
[hereinafter Nahimana Appeals Judgment].
58 Id.
59 Admissibility here refers to evidentiary admissibility and is distinct
from that in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, which concerns admissibility of a
situation before the Court when a domestic jurisdiction is unwilling or unable
to prosecute and the Court finds the matter meets the gravity and interests of
justice thresholds.
60 Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 57, ¶ 304.
61 The Report stated, “The temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited
to one year, beginning on 1 January 1994 and ending on 31 December 1994.
Although the crash of the aircraft carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and
Burundi on 6 April 1994 is considered to be the event that triggered the civil
war and the acts of genocide that followed, the Council decided that the
temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal would commence on 1 January 1994, in
order to capture the planning stage of the crimes.” See U.N. Secretary-General,
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council
Resolution 995 (1994), ¶14, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995).
62 Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 57, ¶ 315.
63 Id. ¶ 316, at 98.
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a continuing crime with a persistent or ongoing course of conduct
that, therefore, came within the ICTR’s jurisdiction. It concluded
that incitement to commit genocide is an inchoate crime that “is
completed as soon as the discourse in question is uttered or
published, even though the effects of incitement may extend in
time.”64 The Chamber, however, again noted that while
Nahimana could not be convicted solely for comments pre-1994,
the Trial Chamber could have considered those comments as
contextual elements. The Chamber, for example, held that the
pre-1994 comments inciting genocide could be used to explain
how the radio station listeners perceived the 1994 broadcasts.
The Appeals Chamber found the pre-1994 radio broadcasts
admissible based on their relevance and probative value.65
Nahimana did not use evidence outside its temporal
jurisdiction to establish the actus reus of genocide or incitement
to commit genocide. Rather, the tribunal admitted the evidence
within the broader contextual analysis of the Rwandan genocide
given its probative value and relevance to acts that actually
occurred within 1994. The Appeals Chambers recognized the
saliency of contextualizing serious crimes that may straddle
both sides of temporal jurisdictional boundaries. Before physical
acts of genocide are undertaken, an environment of revulsion
and animosity must exist that takes time to develop.
Nahimana’s broadcasts, both outside and inside the
ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction, were relevant to establishing this
animus, thereby leading to genocide, and subsequently to
Nahimana’s conviction according to his role. Similarly, my
argument for Context consideration to bolster the gravity
requirement at the ICC requires that the elements of the crime
in question, as a threshold, take place within the territorial and
temporal jurisdictional limits. Similarly to Nahimana, where
conduct by the same person in the course of the same conflict
straddled temporal boundaries, armed conflicts considered at
the ICC can straddle the Court’s temporal and/or territorial
jurisdictional limits.

64
65

Id. ¶ 723, at 230.
Id. ¶ 725.
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ii. Akayesu (ICTR)
Jean-Paul Akayesu was a politician for the Republican
Democratic Movement in Rwanda and was the mayor of the
Taba Commune from April 1993 to June 1994. He was alleged to
have acquiesced to and personally supervised the killing of
Tutsis while a mayor. At the ICTR, he was charged with
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violation of Common
Article 3 to the Geneva Convention concerning conflicts of a noninternational nature.66
At trial, the Tribunal opined that the indictment against
Akayesu could not properly be understood without insight into
the historical, political, and ethnic context of Rwanda. In that
light, the Tribunal was required to consider extra-temporal
evidence in order to determine the existence of genocidal policy.
The Tribunal proceeded through Rwanda’s colonial history from
the 19th century onwards. Prior to the Belgian occupation, the
distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was merely of lineage and
“one could move from one status to another, as one became rich

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 provides: “. . . the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end,
the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:(a) violence to life and
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture;(b) taking of hostages;(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;(d) the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”
Akayesu was also charged under Article 4(2)(e) of the additional protocol as
incorporated by Article 4(e) (“[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any
form of indecent assault”) of the Statute of the Tribunal. Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4(e), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
66
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or poor, or even through marriage.”67 The Tribunal explained
that the permanent distinction between the two groups was
introduced under the Belgian occupation in the 1930s, which
mandated all Rwandans to carry identity cards specifying their
designated group.68 The ethnic divide deepened as the Belgian
government disproportionately favoured the Tutsi population
while the Catholic Church further sought to illuminate the
differences in each group.69
The Tribunal then went on to discuss the power
struggles, which perpetuated in Rwanda from the 1950s
onwards as political parties divided on ethnic, rather than
ideological, lines. The Tribunal explained the continued fighting
between Tutsi rebels, organized both within Rwanda and
externally through Tutsi exiles in Uganda, and the ruling
government of President Habyarimana, who was pro-Hutu. The
historical context was described up until the plane crash killing
President Habyarimana and President Ntaryamirai of Burundi
as they were returning from discussing peace accords in Dar-esSalaam with the disputing Rwandan factions.70
While it was the April 1994 plane crash that constituted
the immediate pre-cursor to the Rwandan Armed Forces (“RAF”)
and the presidential guard killing various Tutsi members of the
coalition government, and subsequently ordinary Tutsi citizens,
the events following the crash did not occur in a vacuum and
were necessary evidence to establish Akayesu’s genocidal intent.
Absent this informative background, Akayesu was no more than
a negligent politician who neither had the will nor the power to
stop killings within his jurisdiction. In that case, the high
threshold for establishing genocidal intent would not have been
met. However, the context of the ethnic divisions that evolved
over the preceding century better placed Akayesu’s actions and
inactions within the realm of genocidal crimes falling within the
ICTR’s jurisdiction.

67 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 81,
at 47 (Sept. 2, 1998), http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/
AKAYESU%20-%20JUDGEMENT.pdf [hereinafter Akayesu Trial Judgment].
68 Id. ¶ 83, at 48. This practice was abolished after the 1994 Genocide.
69 Id. ¶¶ 83-87, at 48-49.
70 Id. ¶ 106, at 57.
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iii. Taylor (SCSL)
Charles Taylor was the president of Liberia from 1997 to
2003. Pursuant to an agreement between the Government of
Liberia and the United Nations, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (“SCSL”) was formed in order to prosecute Taylor for his
crimes committed as a rebel leader and, after his ascendency, as
a president.71 The crux of the charges related to Taylor’s alleged
support of the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”), a rebel
group whose goal was to overthrow the All People’s Congress
(“APC”) Government of Sierra Leone. Taylor supplied arms and
facilities to the RUF in exchange for blood diamonds. RUF’s role
in Sierra Leone’s civil war resulted in thousands of civilian
deaths.
At trial, the defence brought a motion limiting evidence
to the temporal and territorial scope as defined by the SCSL
Statute.72 Taylor’s lawyers objected to the evidence of crimes
allegedly committed in Liberia and evidence that pre-dated the
“indictment period.” The Prosecution, conversely, argued that
the Chamber was permitted to admit any relevant evidence as
stated in Rule 89(C) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Evidence.73 The
prosecution also argued that Taylor’s crimes were continuous in
that his intention was formed prior to the Tribunal’s temporal
mandate and continued after its mandate began, such that both
the actus reus and mens rea could be established within the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction with the anterior temporal evidence
71
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 12-14
(May 18, 2012), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/1283/SCSL03-01-T-1283.pdf [hereinafter Taylor Trial Judgment]. The specific indictment
charged Taylor with crimes against humanity (murder, rape, sexual slavery,
other inhumane acts and enslavement). Taylor was also charged under Article
3 common to the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II for acts of
terrorism, violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons.
He was also charged with conscripting children under 15 years of age.
72
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Defence Motion to
Exclude Evidence Falling Outside the Scope of the Indictment and/or the
Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶¶ 3-4 (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/1101/SCSL-03-01-T1086.PDF.
73
See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 71, ¶¶ 92-97, at 45-47
(submissions of parties relating to limiting evidence to the Statute’s temporal
and geographical jurisdiction).
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serving as relevant context to Sierra Leone’s civil war and
Taylor’s role in it.
The Tribunal cited the Nahimana appeals decision,
discussed above, for the principle that both the act and intention
related to the crime alleged must be committed within the
temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal.74 The Tribunal also
considered the role of temporal jurisdiction in relation to a joint
criminal enterprise. In this regard, it cited the Prlic judgment
from the ICTY for the proposition that “only criminal conduct, in
the form of a joint criminal enterprise or any other form of
responsibility alleged in the indictment, taking place during the
alleged material period [of the indictment] may form the basis
for the conviction of the accused.” The Trial Chamber,
nonetheless, adopted the principle from Nahimana that it could
rely on evidence outside the Tribunal’s temporal scope i) to
clarify a given context, ii) to establish by inference the element,
in particular the mens rea, of criminal conduct occurring during
the material period; or iii) to demonstrate a deliberate pattern
of conduct.75
For evidence outside a Tribunal’s temporal scope, the
Trial Chamber stated that such evidence could only be used to
establish the existence of a continuing crime that, while
commencing anterior to the temporal period mandated under
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, continued into the Tribunal’s
temporal mandate, such that “a conviction may be based only on
that part of such conduct which occurs during the material
period.”76 The prosecution must, nonetheless establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the required elements of a crime
continued into the indictment period.
As for evidence consistent with a pattern of conduct
where some of that evidence falls outside the Tribunal’s
temporal scope, Rule 93 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Evidence
stated that such evidence may be admissible in the interests of
justice. The Trial Chamber adopted the ICTR’s principal in
Bagorosa77 that evidence of prior criminal offences is not
74
75
76
77

Id. ¶ 103, at 49.
Id. ¶ 101 (citing Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 58, ¶ 315).
Id. ¶ 104.
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on
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admissible simply for establishing the accused’s propensity to
commit an offence. Even if the prior crime was identical to the
one of which an accused is charged, evidence outside of the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction to establish proclivity to commit a crime
will not be admitted. Similar to the evidentiary principle in
domestic jurisdictions,78 the Tribunal agreed to accept similarconduct evidence outside its temporal mandate only when “it is
probative of some peculiar feature of the case” or where it is
“highly distinct and unique such that it amounts to a signature
of an identifiable person.”79 The Trial Chamber analogized that
the three exceptions to admitting evidence outside a tribunal’s
temporal jurisdiction apply equally to admitting evidence
outside its geographical scope.
iv. Haradinaj (ICTY)
During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Ramush
Haradinaj was the commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army
(“KLA”). At the ICTY, he was charged with war crimes and
crimes against humanity against Serbs, Romanians, and
Albanians between March and September 1998, during the
Kosovo war.80 After a partial retrial ordered by the Appeals
Chamber subsequent to Haradinaj’s case being dismissed, he
was acquitted of all charges due to a lack of evidence.
In May 2011, Haradinaj brought a motion before the
ICTY Appeals Chamber with regard to the partial retrial
arguing that the indictment included charges that fell outside
the retrial’s scope. Specifically, he argued that any evidence not
relevant to the Jablanica / Jabllanice area should be excluded.
Conversely, the prosecution argued that the evidence relating to
Admissibility of Proposed Testimony of Witness DBY, ¶ 12 (Sept. 18, 2003)
aff’d ICTR-98-41-AR93, (Dec. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Bagosora Decision on
Witness DBY].
78 See R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915; R. v. Handy, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908
(Canadian cases concerning similar-fact evidence).
79 Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 71, ¶ 108 (citing Bagorosa Appeals
Judgment).
80
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84bis-AR73.1, Decision on
Haradinaj’s Appeal on Scope of Partial Retrial (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 31, 2011), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/acdec/en/
110531.pdf.
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Haradinaj’s involvement outside the Jablanica / Jabllanice area
was relevant to demonstrate a continued pattern of conduct and
that the events in those areas did not occur in isolation, but
rather “[t]ook place in a context of violence against perceived
KLA opponents.”81
The Appeals Chamber ruled that evidence submitted
regarding events outside the Jablanica / Jabllanice area was still
relevant even though it pertained to charges previously dropped.
The Appeals Chamber accepted the prosecution’s argument that
the evidence was relevant to the common purpose required to be
shown amongst a Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”).82
V.

Context at the ICC

The decisions cited below from the ICC, in counterdistinction to the ad hoc and hybrid tribunal decisions discussed
above, pertain to the admissibility of an entire situation, as in
the case of the Gaza flotilla incident, or a particular case, as in
the arrest warrant decisions for Al-Bashir and Gaddafi. While at
their root these decisions are evidentiary ones, they all relate to
threshold issues of the scope of temporality and territoriality in
determining whether the ICC should assert its jurisdiction.
i. The Situation in Libya
The situation in Libya, as to the oppositional suppression
by the Gaddafi government from February 2011 onwards, was
referred to the ICC by the UNSC pursuant to Resolution 1970.83
After conducting an investigation, the OTP requested arrest
warrants for Muammar Gaddafi, his son, Saif Al Islam Gaddafi,
and the country’s head of intelligence, Abdullah Al-Senussi.
Specifically, the referral delineated acts committed by these
three individuals from February 15 to February 28, 2011.
Despite Libya not being a State Party to the Court, the UNSC

Id. ¶ 38.
Id.
83 S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 4-8 (Feb. 26, 2011) (referring the situation in Libya
to the ICC; mandating that Libyan authorities cooperate fully with the Court’s
investigation; urging non-State Parties to cooperate fully).
81
82
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referral brought Libya within the Court’s jurisdiction for the
purpose of acts alleged in the referral.84
The application for the arrest warrant contended that the
three individuals committed the crimes against humanity of
murder85 and persecution against an identifiable group.86 To
establish crimes against humanity, there must be an “attack
directed against any civilian population”87 via an organizational
policy. Given the limited temporal jurisdiction provided in the
referral, the Pre-Trial Chamber, in its decision to issue the
arrest warrant, relied on a speech by Muammar Gaddafi given
on January 15, 2011 (which is outside the referral’s temporal
scope) in order to find a reasonable basis to proceed. In the
January 2011 and other speeches, Muammar and Saif Al Islam
Gaddafi condemned the ongoing Tunisian uprisings and “stated
their intention to suppress any kind of demonstrations against
the regime.”88
The Pre-Trial Chamber utilized that speech—as first
referred to in the Prosecutor’s application for an arrest
warrant—to establish reasonable grounds to believe that an

84
Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, ICC-01/11-12,
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to
Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar GADDAFI, Saif Al-Islam GADDAFI
and Abdullah AL-SENUSSI, ¶ 10 (June 27, 2011), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/ CR2011_08350.PDF [hereinafter Situation in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya]. The specific alleged grounds for arrest were
stated as:Count 1: Murder constituting a crime against humanity (Article
7(l)(a) and Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute)
From February 15, 2011, onwards, GADDAFI, as indirect
perpetrators, and SAIF AL ISLAM and AL-SENUSSI, as indirect coperpetrators, committed crimes against humanity in the form of murder
across Libya in, inter alia, Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata, through the
Libyan State apparatus and Security Forces in violation of Articles
7(1)(a) and 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute;
Count 2: Persecution (Article 7(l)(h) and Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome
Statute)
From February 15, 2011, onwards, GADDAFI, as indirect perpetrator,
and SAIF AL ISLAM and AL-SENUSSI, as indirect co-perpetrators,
committed crimes against humanity in the form of persecution across
Libya in, inter alia, Tripoli, Benghazi.
85 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 7(1)(a).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, supra note 84, ¶ 26.
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organizational policy to suppress potential dissenters to the
Gaddafi government was present within the referral’s temporal
scope. It is arguable that an organizational policy could be
established if the temporal scope of the referral was limited to
evidence from February 15 to February 28, 2011, as there were
only two speeches by the accused which referred to the uprisings
and the possibility of suppression within Libya during that time.
The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded, after taking into
account evidence before and during the referral period, that
there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against
humanity, which are within the Court’s jurisdiction, had taken
place. The Court concluded that there existed sufficient evidence
to believe that an organizational plan and policy, as required by
the Statute, was present in the Gaddafi regime after the
uprisings began in Tunisia and Egypt. The Chamber specifically
found “reasonable grounds to believe that the highest level of the
State apparatus, through the legal system, the media monopoly,
and the Security Forces, designed a system which enables the
monitoring, control and repression of any actual or perceived
opposition to Muammar Gaddafi’s regime.”89
While the context of this decision may be within the
context of a particular case in order to establish the
organizational policy requirement of crimes against humanity,
this analysis is equally applicable as precedent to the OTP, and
the Pre-Trial Chamber in authorization decisions, adopting a
policy of expansive information collection from both inside and
outside the Court’s temporal and territorial jurisdiction to meet
the requisite gravity threshold in order to commence an
investigation.
ii. Situation in Sudan
The situation in Sudan was another UNSC referral under
Chapter VII of its Charter. The OTP sought an arrest warrant
for Omar Al-Bashir, the Sudanese president, for committing
“genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against
members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups in Darfur

89

Id. ¶ 24.
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from 2003 to 14 July 2008.”90 Those groups were accused of being
allied with organized armed groups opposing the Sudanese
Government in Darfur. Al-Bashir was accused of ordering the
suppression of Darfurian civilians through the Janjaweed
militia, Sudanese Police Forces, National Intelligence and
Security Service (“NISS”), and the Humanitarian Aid
Commission (“HAC”).91
In its arrest warrant application for Al-Bashir, the
prosecution made an inferential argument to establish genocidal
intent.92 In support of this argument, the prosecution relied on
documentary evidence from the early and mid-1990s. The
documents proffered were:
1) a Secret Bulletin issued by the Sudanese intelligence
services in 1992 advocating for the execution of Fur from key
government positions, intelligence services, the military and
police;
2) a decree issued by President Al-Bashir in 1992 dividing
Darfur into three states with the “aim and effect of diluting the
political strength of the Fur;”
3) a reform law enacted in March 1995 reducing the
Masalit power over land; and
4) a 1986 Armed Forces Memorandum establishing the
chain of command in which President Al-Bashir was in charge
of the armed forces.93

The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that none of those
documents were relevant to establish genocidal intent on the
Sudanese government’s part.The Armed Forces Memorandum
establishing a chain of command between Sudan’s civil
government and the military forces was not necessarily

90 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on
the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 4 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords
/CR2009_01517.PDF [hereinafter Situation in Darfur, Sudan].
91 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Case Information
Sheet, 1 (March 26, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents
/AlBashirEng.pdf.
92 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, supra note 90, ¶ 147.
93 Id. ¶ 166.
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unlawful.94 The Pre-Trial Chamber stated, “evidence of close
coordination provides indicia of the existence of a well
organised governmental structure through which decisions
taken in the upper levels of the [Government] can be effectively
implemented.”95
The majority of the Court, while not admitting evidence
outside the referral’s temporal scope, concluded there was a
reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity and
war crimes had been committed. However, the majority did not
find sufficient evidence of genocide. In her dissent, Judge Anita
Uṧacka concluded that Al-Bashir possessed sufficient genocidal
intent for the arrest warrant to include the charge of genocide.
Unfortunately, while Judge Uṧacka relied on contextual factors
to determine genocidal intent, the extent of her dissent was
limited to matters falling within the referral’s temporal scope.
The Al-Bashir decision illustrates an instance where the
Court did not admit extra-temporal evidence in its
determination. Nonetheless, what must be kept in mind is that
the standard of proof at the arrest warrant stage is higher than
at the preliminary examination and investigation stages.96 The
herein argument for Context advocates that extra-temporal and
extra-territorial information should be aggregated with
information from within the Court’s temporal and territorial
jurisdiction at the initial stages of the prosecutorial process in
order to fulfill the gravity threshold where bifurcating the
consideration of that information would not meet the threshold.
Therefore, this decision does not necessarily undermine the
Court’s ability to consider Context nor serves as a contrary
precedent.

Id. ¶¶ 167-69.
Situation in Darfur, Sudan, supra note 90, ¶ 169.
96 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 58(1)(a) (expounding the standard
for issuing an arrest as “reasonable grounds to believe”); see also Manuel
Ventura, The ‘Reasonable Basis to Proceed’ Threshold in the Kenya and Côte
d’Ivoire Proprio Motu Investigation Decisions: The International Criminal
Court’s Lowest Evidentiary Standard?, in EDUARDO VALENCIA-OSPINA, ED, THE
LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 48-80 (2013)
(comparing the “reasonable basis to believe” standard with the “reasonable
grounds to believe” standard).
94
95
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iii. The Situation in Comoros
In May 2013, the Union of Comoros, a small island nation
off the coast of East Africa, made a referral to the ICC for crimes
within the Court’s jurisdiction allegedly committed by the Israeli
Defence Forces (“IDF”) when their helicopters surrounded and
shot at aid workers aboard a humanitarian flotilla attempting to
deliver aid to the Gaza Strip.97 The majority of the alleged crimes
took place on the MV Maria Marmara, a vessel registered with
Comoros, and thus falling within the Court’s territorial
jurisdiction. The attack resulted in nine deaths.98 In its referral,
Comoros discussed the attack’s wider political context:
The attack on the flotilla must be seen in the wider context of
the Israel-Palestine conflict. It is a follow up to and a
consequence of Operation Cast Lead (December 2008 –
January 2009), which is still the subject of investigation by the
Human Rights Council and was condemned by the Goldstone
inquiry report. Furthermore, the blockade of Gaza has been
condemned by the United Nations and the international
community at large as a collective punishment that deprives
the people of Gaza of the most basic of commodities and
services. Indeed, the UNFFM99 described the situation in Gaza
as totally intolerable and unacceptable. The situation in Gaza
is grave and the attack on the flotilla, which was aimed at
perpetuating the situation, must therefore meet the test of
gravity.100

Operation Cast Lead was a military campaign by the
Israeli Government aimed at ceasing rocket fire into Israel by
Hamas militants. The campaign, which lasted from December
27, 2008 to January 18, 2009, bombarded key sites in the Gaza
Strip, including police stations and military outposts in Gaza,
97 Referral, Int’l Crim. Ct., Union of Comoros, May 14, 2013 (the Union
of Comoros referred the matter of the May 31, 2010 Israeli raid on the
Humanitarian Aid Flotilla bound for Gaza Strip to the Prosecutor for the
International Criminal Court, pursuant to Articles 12, 13, and 14 of the Rome
Statute).
98 Id. ¶ 12.
99 Acronym for ‘United Nations Fact Finding Mission.’
100 Referral, Int’l Crim. Ct., Union of Comoros, supra note 97.
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Khan Yunis and Rafah. Israel also declared a blockade of the
Gaza Strip on January 3, 2009.101 The conflict resulted in 1,417
Palestinian deaths. Moreover, as stated by the United Nations
Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, there was
“massive destruction of livelihoods and a significant
deterioration of infrastructure and basic services.”102
According to the World Food Programme, anywhere from
35% to 60% of Gaza’s agricultural industry was destroyed. The
UN Emergency Relief Coordinator stated after the conflict that
only 120 truckloads daily were getting into Gaza, whereas 500
truckloads, at minimum, were required.103 There were also
allegations of the Hamas government diverting humanitarian
aid.104 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs’ Gaza Humanitarian Situation Report stated that 80% of
the Gazan population could not support themselves and were
therefore dependent on humanitarian aid.105 With this
background, the Gaza aid flotilla—consisting of four cargo
vessels and four passenger vessels occupying approximately 700
people from 36 countries—set out to deliver humanitarian aid to
the Gaza Strip in May 2010. The flotilla and its passengers were
unarmed, with the vessels containing only humanitarian aid.
After the Prosecutor’s decision to not investigate the
alleged crimes aboard the flotilla for want of gravity and not
being in the ‘interest of justice,’ representatives on behalf of
Comoros brought an application pursuant to Article 53(3) asking
the Pre-Trial Chamber to make a request to the Prosecutor to
reconsider her decision. For our purposes, the pertinent part of
Comoros’s application is the political context, or as framed in
this paper the extra-territorial information relevant to the

101 Human Rights Comm., Report of the United Nations Fact Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶¶ 185, 831, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (2009).
102 G.A. Res. ES-10/2, Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem
and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Jan. 2, 2009), [hereinafter
Illegal Israeli Actions].
103 Israel Must Allow Full Access for Aid and Supplies to Rehabilitate
Gaza – UN Relief Chief, U.N. BLOG TODAY (Jan. 27, 2009, 5:10 PM), http://unblog-985-320-6006.blogspot.com/2009/01/israel-must-allow-full-access-foraid.html.
104 Id.
105 Illegal Israeli Actions, supra note 102.
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Israel-Palestinian conflict, as a result of the pre-existing
blockade of the Gaza Strip.
Comoros argued that “the Prosecutor certainly can take
account of all acts that occurred during the blockade and
occupation in order to determine whether the acts on the vessels
over which she has jurisdiction could constitute war crimes of
sufficient gravity under the ICC’s Statute in order to decide
whether they should be investigated.”106 For Comoros, acts
outside the Court’s territorial jurisdiction could be taken into
account in the Prosecutor’s determination to investigate the
situation.107 As a result, Comoros contended, had the Prosecutor
considered the wider context of the blockade and occupation
following Operation Cast Lead—both aboard the MV Mari
Marmara and within the Gaza Strip (while also extending the
timeline to before the flotilla attack)—she would have
determined that the attack met the gravity threshold.108
According to Comoros, if the blockade was unlawful by
disproportionately targeting civilians or amounting to collective
punishment (as concluded by the International Committee of the
Red Cross and various UN bodies), then all the acts that followed
in enforcing the blockade would themselves be unlawful.109 It
also argued that there was a reasonable basis to believe, unless
and until disproved by an evidence-based investigation, that the
particular IDF operation to intercept the flotilla formed part of
a plan and policy to uphold the unlawful blockade. In this
regard, Comoros utilized the language of Article 8(1) of the
Statute, which only requires that crimes be committed as part of
a policy, plan, or large-scale pattern. It argued that the Statute
contained no express provision that each act constituting the
plan, policy, or large-scale pattern must come within the Court’s
temporal or territorial jurisdiction.110
The argument by Comoros for the consideration of
political context is, as far as can be discerned, the first such
106 Comoros Application, supra note 24, ¶ 14. Recall that at the time of
the flotilla attack, the State of Palestine was not a State Party to the Rome
Statute.
107 Id. ¶ 15.
108 Id.
109 Id. ¶ 16.
110 Id. ¶ 68.
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argument brought before the ICC. While the decisions from the
ad hoc tribunals and ICC cited above may in vacuo have
admitted evidence outside the Court’s traditional temporal or
territorial jurisdiction, those decisions have not translated into
any precedent. Comoros was, in effect, arguing that the Court
should aggregate evidence from the flotilla attack with evidence
from attacks during Operation Cast Lead and the subsequent
blockade when deciding whether the gravity threshold is
fulfilled.
The argument of this article mirrors that of Comoros – to
use an aggregate expansive approach to information collection
at the preliminary examination and investigation stages to
assist in fulfilling the gravity requirement. This approach can,
and should be, considered in every ICC situation and case.
However, in employing this expansive approach to jurisdiction,
the two caveats discussed above must be taken into account.
First, information from attacks both inside and outside the
Court’s traditional jurisdiction must be from the same conflict.
Second, an expansive approach should only be used when an
otherwise bifurcated approach to determining jurisdiction would
not meet the gravity threshold.
VI.

Context and Evidentiary Admissibility

As in domestic legal systems, the ICC distinguishes
between evidentiary admissibility and the weight to be given to
admissible evidence.111 Whereas admissibility of evidence is a
threshold inquiry, it may be given little or no weight after its
admission. The admissibility and, ultimately, the weight to be
accorded to evidence is decided by the Pre-Trial Chamber judge
or the panel at trial. As there is no jury system at the ICC, judges
are the ultimate finders of fact. As the SCSL Trial Chamber
stated in Brima et al., “[i]ssues before the Special Court are
conducted before professional judges, who by virtue of their
education and experience are able to ponder independently

The reference to evidentiary admissibility here is distinct from the
concept of jurisdictional admissibility in Articles 17 and 19 of the Statute,
which concerns whether a matter is of sufficient gravity and in the ‘interests
of justice’ to warrant coming before the Court.
111
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without prejudice to each and every case which will be brought
before them.”112 The same principle would apply to the ICC, in
which complete discretion is given to judges as to what evidence
is admissible and, subsequently, the weight it receives.
The Statute has various provisions concerning
evidentiary admissibility. Upon a motion by either party, the
Trial Chamber can make a ruling “on the admissibility or
relevance of evidence.”113 In deciding on admissibility, the Court
balances the evidence’s probative value against “any prejudice
that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or to a fair evaluation
of the testimony of a witness.”114 Conversely, the Court’s Rules
outline that evidence deemed “irrelevant or inadmissible shall
not be considered.”115
As with the IMT, the ad hoc tribunals use an inquisitorial
model for admissibility, with a loose evidentiary threshold. The
IMT Charter articulated this principle by stating, “[t]he
Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It
shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious
and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence
which it deems to be of probative value.”116 The ICTY, ICTR, and
ECCC also emphasised relevance and probity when making
decisions on the admissibility of evidence.117 The SCSL took a
more expansive approach to evidentiary admissibility by

112 Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Decision on
the Prosecution Motion for Concurrent Hearing of Evidence Common to Cases
SCSL-2004-15-PT and SCSL-2004-16-PT, ¶ 38 (May 11, 2004).
113 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 64(9).
114 Id. art. 69(4).
115 ICC-ASP/1/3, and Coor.1 (2002), Rule 64(3).
116
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, ¶ 19, Aug. 8, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 279.
117 See, e.g., ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89(C)-(D) (July
8, 2015) (as amended) [hereinafter ICTY Rules] (Rule 89(D) states that “[a]
Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.”); ECCC Internal Rules, Rules
81(1), 87(2), Rev. 9 (July 16, 2016) (as revised) [hereinafter ECCC Rules]; STL
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 149(c) (2009), STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.6Coor.1 (Apr. 3, 2014) (as corrected) [hereinafter STL RPE] (“[a] Chamber may
admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.”); see also
id. Rule 149(d) (“[a] Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.”).
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allowing its chamber to admit any relevant evidence without
conducting a balancing test.118
At the ICC, the threshold of admitting evidence is lower
at the investigation and confirmation of charges stages than at
trial. At the confirmation stage, evidentiary challenges have, by
and large, failed and only been successful in lessening its
weight.119 In Lubanga, the Trial Chamber held that “[t]here
should be no automatic reasons for either admitting or excluding
a piece of evidence, but instead the court should consider the
position overall.”120 In the same decision, the Trial Chamber
stated, “the Chamber must be careful not to impose artificial
limits on its ability to consider any piece of evidence freely,
subject to the requirements of fairness.”121 Moreover, the Trial
Chamber must first “ensure that the evidence is prima facie
relevant to the trial, in that it relates to the matters that are
properly to be considered by the Chamber in its investigation of
the charges against the accused and its consideration of the
views and concerns of participating victims.”122 The Trial
Chamber must then assess whether the evidence has probative
value.123
In Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, the Pre-Trial
Chamber held:

118 SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89(C) (May 28, 2010) (as
amended) [hereinafter SCSL RPE].
119 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 70 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF [hereinafter Katanga] (Pre-trial
Chamber evidentiary rulings do not extend to the Trial Chamber); see id. ¶
189. The Pre-Trial Chamber also stated, “should charges against the suspects
be confirmed, any ruling on the admissibility of a particular item of evidence
for the purposes of the confirmation hearing and the present decision will not
preclude a subsequent determination of the admissibility of that same evidence
later in the proceedings because the ‘admission of evidence’ [at the pre-trial
stage] is without prejudice to the Trial Chamber’s exercise of its functions and
powers to make a final determination as to the admissibility and probative
value of any evidence.” Id. ¶ 71; see also id. ¶ 193.
120 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1399, Decision on
the Admissibility of Four Documents, ¶ 29 (June 13, 2008), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_03425.PDF.
121 Id.
122 Id. ¶ 27.
123 Id. ¶ 28.
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[U]nder Article 69(4) of the Statute the Chamber may exercise
its discretion when determining the relevance and/or
admissibility of any item of evidence. According to Article 69(4)
of the Statute, probative value is one of the factors to be taken
into consideration when assessing the admissibility of a piece
of evidence. Therefore, in the Chamber’s view it must look at
the intrinsic coherence of any item of evidence and declare
inadmissible those items of evidence of which probative value
is deemed prima facie absent after such an analysis. Any other
assessment of the probative value of any given item of evidence
will be made in light of the whole body of evidence introduced
at the confirmation hearing.124

The above background to the ICC’s approach to
evidentiary admissibility, which falls in line with the rules and
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, establishes that the Court
will cast a wide net in determining what evidence to consider. In
this vein, the criteria for admitting evidence lies in its relevance
and probative value (judged against its prejudicial effect), rather
than a strict construction of the Statute’s temporal and
territorial parameters. I correlate the Court’s approach to
evidentiary admissibility with what the OTP and Pre-Trial
Chamber’s approach should be when collecting information at
the preliminary examination and investigation stages. The OTP
and Pre-Trial Chamber, when determining whether to consider
information, is best advised to employ an expansive approach
prioritizing relevance and probity, rather than from where and
when the information originates. In the midst of the same
conflict where the gravity threshold would not otherwise be met,
the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber can consider information
equally from times and places both inside and outside the
Court’s traditional temporal and territorial jurisdiction. Only
then will the Court be able to adequately consider the entire
nature of a conflict, especially one that transcends State borders
and occurs over a prolonged period of time.
As in Nahimana, the admitted information, if outside the
Court’s temporal or territorial jurisdiction, would be prohibited
from use to establish the required actus reus and mens rea of the

124

Katanga, supra note 119, ¶ 77.
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crimes in question. However, if such information is relevant and
of probative value, it can be considered in conjunction with
information within the Court’s strict jurisdiction to conclude
that an act meets the gravity threshold to commence a formal
investigation. In other words, simply because information
presented to the OTP or the Pre-Trial Chamber does not meet
the Statute’s strict temporal or territorial parameters, it does
not mean that it is not relevant or probative. This is especially
true when during the same conflict there is information from
attacks occurring within the Court’s temporal and territorial
jurisdiction. At the preliminary examination, investigation and,
if needed, authorization stages, relevant and probative
information can, and should, be considered both inside and
outside the Statute’s strict jurisdictional parameters.
Nonetheless, as established by the ad hoc tribunals and the
Court in the case law above, the required elements of the crime
in question must take place within the Court’s jurisdictional
limitations. This requirement is in line with my assertion that
for Context to apply, one of the four bases of jurisdiction as laid
out in the Statute must first be established.
In sum, the Court’s admissibility of evidence has
prioritized relevance and probity. Similarly, during the
preliminary examination and investigation stages, the OTP and
Pre-Trial Chamber should employ the same criteria of relevance
and probity when considering information. The OTP and PreTrial Chamber can, and should, consider information from
attacks both inside and outside the Court’s temporal or
territorial jurisdiction when those attacks occur in the midst of
the same conflict and, if otherwise considered in isolation, would
not meet the gravity threshold. This approach is justified
according to both the Statute’s procedural framework and
intentional textual ambiguity of the gravity threshold, as
Section V will now outline.
VII.

Justifying the Use of Context in the Rome
Statute

I divide the justifications for Context consideration into
procedural and textual justifications. While the procedural
justification outlined below is more of an overview of the existing
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prosecutorial process, the textual justification delves into
specific statutory provisions. I focus on these two strands of
justification to illustrate that my argument for Context does not
require any amendments to the Statute or its accompanying
documents. On the contrary, the OTP, and subsequently the
Court, can expand temporal and territorial jurisdiction without
reading any additional text into the Statute or interpreting the
Statute in a manner contrary to its purposes outlined in its
Preamble.
a. Procedural Justification – ‘The Funnel Approach’
The Statute distinguishes between “preliminary
examinations,” “situations,” and “cases,” wherein the former two
terms are broader and in relation to a referral before an arrest
warrant is issued for a particular accused. A case must always
be within a situation, which is always preceded by a preliminary
examination. As the Court stated in the Kenya authorization
decision in relation to post election violence in 2007-08,
prosecution proceeds in stages that begin with a situation and
proceed to a case where one or more suspects have been
identified.125 As Phillippe Kirsch has stated, “the general
approach of referring ‘situations,’ rather than ‘cases,’ seems a
prudent one. This helps reduce the arguably unseemly prospect
of State Parties referring complaints against specific
individuals, which might create a perception of using the Court
to ‘settle scores.’”126
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a
crime referred to in Article 5 if a situation in which one or more

125 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (March 31, 2010),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_02399.PDF (“[T]he Chamber
wishes to underline that the Statute is drafted in a manner which tends to
solve questions related to admissibility at different stages of the proceedings
up until trial. These stages begin with a ‘situation’ and end with a concrete
‘case’, where one or more suspects have been identified for the purpose of
prosecution.”).
126
PHILIPPE KIRSCH & DARRYL ROBINSON, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A COMMENTARY 623 (Antonio Cassese, Paola
Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
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of such crimes appear to have been committed is referred to the
Prosecutor by (a) a State Party; or (b) the UN Security
Council.127 The purpose of a referral is to request the Prosecutor
to investigate a situation to determine whether one or more
persons could be charged with a crime within the Court’s
jurisdiction.128 While the OTP can proceed with an investigation
of a situation if it has been referred by the UNSC or by a State
Party, for an investigation initiated proprio motu, the
Prosecutor, upon concluding a reasonable basis to proceed with
an investigation of a situation, must request authorization from
the Pre-Trial Chamber.129
Regulation 29 of the Office of the Prosecutor gives the
prosecutor discretion in deciding whether there exists a
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, taking into
account jurisdiction, admissibility (including gravity), and the
interests of justice.130 In November 2013, the OTP published a
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, in which it
recognized guiding principles of independence, impartiality, and
objectivity in its preliminary examinations in determining
whether to initiate an investigation.131 Citing Article 42 of the

Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 13.
Id. art. 14.
129 Id. art. 15(3).
130
Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09,
Regulation 29 (Apr. 23, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/female
counsel/RegulationsOTPEng.pdf. The full text of Regulation 29 states:
1. In acting under article 15, paragraph 3, or article 53, paragraph 1,
the Office shall produce an internal report analysing the
seriousness of the information and considering the factors set out
in article 53, paragraph 1 (a) to (c), namely issues of jurisdiction,
admissibility (including gravity), as well as the interests of justice,
pursuant to rules 48 and 104. The report shall be accompanied by
a recommendation on whether there is a reasonable basis to
initiate an investigation.
2. In order to assess the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed in
the situation the Office shall consider various factors including
their scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact.
3. Based on the report, the Prosecutor shall determine whether there
is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.
4. The evaluation shall continue for as long as the situation remains
under investigation. 5. In acting under article 53, paragraph 2, the
Office shall apply mutatis mutandis sub-regulations 1 to 4.
131 See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination, supra note 13, § III.
127
128
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Statute, the OTP held that independence means that “decisions
shall not be influenced or altered by the presumed or known
wishes of any party, or in connection with efforts to secure
cooperation.”132 Impartiality means selecting situations in a nonpartisan manner and applying the same methodology and
standards to each examination. Lastly, objectivity refers to the
OTP considering incriminating and exonerating circumstances
equally.133
Prosecutorial impartiality and independence have also
been defined by the ECHR. In order to establish independence,
the ECHR has stated that there must be regard to, inter alia,
the manner of appointment, the existence of guarantees against
outside pressure, and whether the Tribunal presents an
appearance of independence.134 For impartiality, the Tribunal
must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias, and must
be objectively impartial in that it must offer sufficient
guarantees so as to exclude any legitimate doubt of partiality.135
In this regard, both the Policy Paper and the ECHR
jurisprudence demonstrate a concern with the presence of
outside pressure and personal bias when selecting which
matters to prosecute. The ECHR adds factors relating to outside
appearance that would suggest it retains a higher threshold for
prosecutorial independence and impartiality that is not
considered by the OTP in its Policy Paper.
The Policy Paper outlines a four-phase process for the
OTP to determine what situations warrant investigation. Phase
1 involves an initial assessment to determine whether the
situation in question falls within the traditional notions of
jurisdiction, as discussed above.136 Evidence falling outside the
traditional notions of jurisdiction can “be revisited in light of new
information or circumstances, such as a change in the
jurisdictional situation.”137 Phase 2 examines the Court’s

Id. ¶ 26; see also Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 42(1), (5), (7).
See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination, supra note 13, ¶ 41.
134
Morris v. United Kingdom, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 387 ¶ 58 (2002).
135
Id.; see also Findlay v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22107/93 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. ¶ 76 (Feb. 25, 2997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58016.
136 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 13.
137 Id. ¶ 79.
132
133
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jurisdiction under both territorial jurisdiction138 and subject
matter jurisdiction.139 Phase 2 is more specific than Phase 1 in
that it only considers communications to the OTP that were not
rejected in Phase 1. Phase 3 conducts both complementarity and
gravity analyses, and results in an Article 17 Report.140 Phase 4
examines whether the investigation is in the interests of justice,
as required by Article 53(1). As of 2015, the Office of the
Prosecutor has opened 22 preliminary examinations, twelve of
which proceeded to a formal investigation and four to a decision
not to proceed with an investigation.141 The OTP has decided not
to proceed with investigations in situations in Iraq (gravity
threshold required under Article 53 not met),142 Venezuela,143
Korea (no subject matter jurisdiction),144 and Palestine (not a
recognized state at time of preliminary examination).145
The multistep ICC prosecution commences with a
preliminary examination, wherein the OTP considers
communications by State Parties or the UNSC. It then narrows
to a “situation” framed by definitive territorial and temporal
limits, and then narrows further to the issuance of an arrest
warrant for the accused within those territorial and temporal
parameters. I term this process the Funnel Approach to
jurisdiction. The Funnel Approach—dwindling the scope of
prosecution from a preliminary examination based on a referral,
or initiated proprio motu, to jurisdiction over a particular
situation and then to a particular accused—is unique to
international criminal law.

Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 1, 12.
Id. art. 5.
140 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 13, ¶ 82.
141 SCHABAS, supra note 12, at 74.
142 Letters to Senders re Iraq, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT.
(Feb. 9, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FD042F2E-678E-4EC68121-690BE61D0B5A/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February
_2007.pdf.
143 Letters to Senders re Venezuela, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM.
CT. (Feb. 9, 2006).
144 Situation in the Republic of Korea, Office of the Prosecutor, Article 5
Report, INT’L CRIM. CT. (June 2014).
145
Situation in Palestine, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT. (April
2012).
138
139
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In domestic criminal systems, there does not exist any
analogous referral processes, and certainly there is no
investigation of political conflicts between State and non-State
actors in order to determine whether a crime within a court’s
jurisdiction has taken place. The ICC’s Funnel Approach is also
distinct from other international courts and tribunals. The ad
hoc tribunals did not have a referral system and the temporal
and territorial jurisdiction of every case remained the same
irrespective of the accused. The International Court of Justice
does not have a referral system, but rather requires explicit
consent by both parties as well as a determination that the
subject matter falls within the ICJ’s jurisdiction.146
The ICC’s OTP, governed by independence, impartiality,
and objectivity, begins with a broad canvas that can, and
normatively should, consider information from inside and
outside the Court’s temporal or territorial jurisdiction. This
broad mandate at the earlier parts of the prosecutorial process
is necessary given the increasingly cross-border nature of
conflicts. If the Court continues to implement a strict and
bifurcated approach to its jurisdiction, it would ignore necessary
information and fail to appreciate a cross-border conflict in its
entirety. Furthermore, the Court would not utilize the openended ability to collect information at the earlier stages of the
process (in this analogy, the top wide part of the funnel). The
Funnel Approach is consistent with the Court’s rules and
jurisprudence emphasizing relevance and probity, as opposed to
strict temporal and territorial parameters. As such, the Court’s
ability to consider Context is placed within the Statute’s
procedural framework at the early stages of preliminary
examinations and investigations, and should be used
accordingly to close the impunity gap. By doing so, the Court
will be better placed to eventually prosecute perpetrators who
are non-State Party nationals and who reside in non-State Party
territories when those perpetrators carry out attacks that fall
within the Court’s traditional temporal and territorial
jurisdiction.

Statutes of the International Court of Justice art. 26, June 26, 1945,
33 U.N.T.S 933.
146
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b. Textual Justification – ‘Gravity’
While the Funnel Approach and the primacy of
considering evidence according to its relevance and probity sets
out the general discretionary framework for the OTP and the
Court in deciding whether to prosecute a case, there exists
specific open-ended text within the Statute itself that allows for
the Prosecutor to consider Context when asserting jurisdiction.
The most relevant example to the herein discussion is the
gravity threshold. The term ‘gravity’ is contained in Articles 53
(as a criterion to commence a formal investigation), 17 (relating
to the admissibility of a situation that is not being prosecuted at
the national level), 59 (arrest by a custodial state), 77
(penalties), 78 (sentencing), 84 (revision of sentence), and 90
(competing requests for extradition). For our purposes, Articles
17 and 53 are most important, and they state:
Article 17: Issues of Admissibility
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and
article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible
where:
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further
action by the Court.
Article 53: Initiation of an investigation
1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information
made available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless
he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to
proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an
investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:
(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the
interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial
reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the
interests of justice.
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis
to proceed and his or her determination is based solely on
subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial
Chamber.
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2. If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there
is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution because:
(b) The case is inadmissible under article 17; or
(c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into
account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the
crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the
alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime;
the Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the
State making a referral under article 14 or the Security
Council in a case under article 13, paragraph (b), of his or her
conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion.147

Margaret deGuzman’s work has concluded, among other
things, that the concept of gravity is inherently ambiguous and
this ambiguity has enabled it to serve a constructive role in the
ICC regime. In her assessment, gravity’s ambiguity has enabled
the Court to bridge the divide between States that wanted the
ICC to have a broad mandate and States concerned about the
Court’s potential for infringing on State sovereignty. According
to deGuzman, States could therefore agree that the Court’s
mandate is to prosecute the most serious crimes of international
concern without agreeing what that would include.148 I argue
that this inherent ambiguity assists the OTP in collecting
information both inside and outside the Court’s territorial and
temporal jurisdiction in order to reach the gravity threshold.
Neither the Court’s Statute nor any of its supporting documents
place limitations on what basis, and in accordance with what
information, the OTP is to determine whether a matter reaches
the gravity threshold to commence an investigation.

Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 17, 53.
Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity Rhetoric: The Good, the Bad, and the
‘Political’, 107 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 421, 421-22 (2013); see also Margaret M.
deGuzman, The International Criminal Court’s Gravity Jurisprudence at Ten,
12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 421, 475 (2013); Margaret M. deGuzman,
How Serious are International Crimes? The Gravity Problem in International
Criminal Law, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 18 (2012); Choosing to Prosecute:
Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, supra note 28;
Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International
Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1400 (2009).
147
148
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The OTP’s Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations
sets out that the gravity assessment includes both qualitative
and quantitative factors even though the OTP, as discussed
above, has prioritized the number of victims when determining
whether or not to open an investigation. According to the Policy
Paper, factors in the gravity determination include the scale of
crimes, nature of crimes, and manner of crimes’ commission and
their impact.149 Scale means more than just numbers. Scale can
include an analysis of the temporal or geographical spread. The
gravity of crimes with greater quantitative intensity over a short
period of time is higher than crimes with less quantitative
intensity over a long period of time.150
As for the nature of the crimes, the OTP has prioritized
killing, rape, and child conscription.151 The manner of crimes
refers to the means employed to execute the crime, the degree of
participation, the intent of the perpetrator, and the extent to
which the crimes were systematic or resulted from a plan or
organised policy or, otherwise, resulted from the abuse of power
or official capacity. The OTP has placed particular emphasis on
cruelty, crimes against defenceless victims, crimes involving
discrimination, and abuse of de jure or de facto power violating
the responsibility to protect principle.152 The scale of crimes
refers to the particular suffering placed upon victims, their
increased vulnerability, subsequent terror instilled, or the
social, economic, and environmental damage inflicted on
affected communities.153 As the Statute is silent as to how the
OTP should determine gravity,154 the Policy Paper remains the
most concrete explanation of the gravity threshold.
The OTP does not place any fixed weight on any of the
above criteria in assessing gravity, but determines gravity based
on the facts and circumstances of each situation.155 In assessing
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 13, ¶ 61.
Id. ¶ 62.
151 Id. ¶ 63.
152 Id. ¶ 64.
153 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 13, ¶ 65.
154
See KEVIN JON HELLER, SITUATIONAL GRAVITY UNDER THE ROME
STATUTE IN FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33 (2009).
155 Fabricio Guariglia, The Office of the Prosecutor and the Selection of
Situations and Cases, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
149
150
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the above criteria of scale, nature, manner, and impact, it
becomes clear that the factors in assessing gravity are openended in nature and not necessarily required to be constricted
by the strict territorial and temporal limits listed in the Statute.
As such, the OTP would be at liberty to consider Context within
a given situation when conducting a preliminary examination.
Also, given the advocacy nature of the Prosecutor’s role, the OTP
can permissibly err on the side of expansive evidence gathering
to conclude the gravity threshold is met in initiating an
investigation.156
A practical example of when Context consideration can
result in the OTP reaching the gravity threshold when it may
not reach that threshold otherwise is when a referral is made by
a State Party or the UNSC in a scenario where there were
potential crimes committed both before and after the referral.
While the UNSC referral for the Situation in Sudan expanded
its temporal scope back to July 1, 2002,157 the referral for the
Situation in Libya, as stated above, limited the temporal scope
only back to February 15, 2011.158 Therefore, this limited the
OTP to investigating crimes within that time span.
A scenario can arise where UNSC members, fearing
prosecution of their own nationals, will come to a compromise to
limit the permissible timespan under which the OTP can
investigate. In this regard, there may be casualties on both sides
of the temporal scope of the referral, whereby the scale, nature,
manner, and impact may not suffice if limited to the referral’s
temporal mandate. Relevant and probative information may
straddle both sides of the Court’s jurisdiction where some
information falls within its jurisdiction and other information
does not. For instance, there may have been intense spurts of

CRIMINAL COURT 360 (2015).
156
See Alexander Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics?: Prosecutorial
Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
583 (2007) (arguing that the Prosecutor’s role is inherently political).
157
S.C. Res. 1593, ¶1 (Mar. 31, 2005) (“Acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since
1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. . .”).
158
Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar
Mohammed Abu Minyar GADDAFI, Saif Al-Islam GADDAFI and Abdullah
ALSENUSSI, supra note 83.
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bombing with numerous casualties before the commencement of
the referral’s temporal scope but substantially less casualties
within the temporal scope. As in the (initial) Iraq and Palestine
referrals, this may lead the OTP to conclude that the required
gravity threshold has not been satisfied, thereby not
commencing an investigation. On the other hand, in accordance
with the Funnel Approach and accounting for the standards of
relevance and probity, the OTP may take an expansive approach
to temporal jurisdiction in its gravity analysis. Therefore,
combining the number of casualties both before and within the
referral’s temporal scope may fulfill the gravity threshold
resulting in an investigation. All of this is keeping in mind the
two caveats presented above that the information must be for
the same conflict and would not reach the gravity threshold
otherwise. Lastly, one of the four bases for jurisdiction must be
fulfilled before gravity’s ambiguity can assist in applying a
contextual approach.
VIII. Implications of Context Consideration
a. Filling the Impunity Gap
Two of the policy objectives stated by the OTP in its
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations are: i) ending
impunity through positive complementarity; and ii) prevention.
The former reiterates the Court’s exceptional character that
asserts jurisdiction when national courts are unwilling or unable
to investigate and/or prosecute a matter.159 Complementarity
serves to close the impunity gap where those matters not
pursued on a national level are referred to the ICC. Similarly,
the prevention objective requires the OTP to “systematically and
proactively collect open source information on alleged crimes
that [ ] appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.”160
Both of these objectives, whether to step in as a complementary
Court to national jurisdictions or work with national
jurisdictions to prevent crimes before they occur, in fact, support

159
160

Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 13, ¶¶ 100-03.
Id. ¶ 104.
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an expansive approach to information collection by the OTP,
whether it ultimately asserts jurisdiction or not.
I have alluded throughout this paper to the need for the
ICC to assert jurisdiction expansively as doing so would fill the
impunity gap. I use this term to mean two distinct but,
nonetheless, related concepts. The first recognizes that the ICC
is a complimentary Court of last resort and its jurisdiction only
takes hold once a national court is unwilling or unable to
prosecute a matter. If a State Party does not proceed to
investigate an attack or incident and, subsequently, the ICC
finds that that matter falls outside its jurisdiction or is otherwise
inadmissible based on insufficient gravity or interests of justice
grounds, a jurisdictional vacuum would be created outside the
prosecutorial will of State Parties and the ICC.
The second manifestation of the impunity gap concerns
non-State Parties that, out of prosecutorial discretion or political
sensitivities, decide not to investigate a matter. This has been
the case with various soldiers or defence contractors that the
U.S. has not prosecuted as a result of alleged crimes committed
while in Iraq.161 Whereas in the first concept the impunity gap
is created by the ICC’s unwillingness to launch an investigation
based on jurisdictional or admissibility grounds, this second type
of impunity gap arises due to the ICC’s legal constriction in
venturing into the jurisdiction of a non-State Party absent an
Article 12(3) Declaration or UNSC referral.
While the second type of impunity gap cannot be
remedied even with expansive notions of jurisdiction, under
Context, the OTP, and subsequently the Pre-Trial Chamber, can
remedy the first type of impunity gap by considering Context
when the gravity threshold under strict textual notions of
jurisdiction would not be met. In this regard, Context is a tool for
jurisdictional expansiveness that assists the Court in its
admissibility analyses by bolstering the information available to
meet the gravity threshold.

See, e.g., Lara Jakes & Rebecca Santana, Iraq Prime Minister:
Immunity Issue Scuttled U.S. Troop Deal, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/22/iraq-pm-immunity-issuescuttled-us-troop-deal/.
161
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An expansive approach is not only in line with the ICC’s
procedural framework under the Funnel Approach and its
textual permissibility, but also accords with the Statute’s
underlying principles of prosecuting the most serious crimes of
international concern.162 Akhavan argues that prosecuting a
select number of mid to high level officials in international
criminal tribunals, in fact, serves as a general deterrent to
future atrocities. He states, “it is not necessary . . . to punish a
large number of perpetrators in order to achieve deterrence . . .
[t]he punishment of particular individuals—whether star
villains such as Karadzić or Mladić or ordinary perpetrators
such as Tadić and Erdemović—becomes an instrument through
which respect for the rule of law is instilled into the popular
consciousness.”163According to Akhavan, prosecutions can
contribute to replacing a culture of impunity with a culture of
compliance.164
While it may be speculative to conclude that increased
international prosecutions will result in fewer future
atrocities—and the reality has not provided any such
suggestion—expanding the ICC’s jurisdiction by applying
Context will narrow the current space occupied by many
perpetrators who have carried out attacks on State Party
territories. These perpetrators have essentially escaped
prosecution whether or not they are State Party nationals. Their
impunity stems from the inability or unwillingness of their own
State to prosecute them and the ICC’s reluctance to commence
an investigation.165
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 1.
Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former
Yugoslavia?, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 747, 749 (1999).
164
David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of
International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 487, 486 (1999). Wippman
questions this assertion by Akhavan in that a transformation from a culture of
impunity to compliance would require far more than the occasional
punishment of a particular offender since i) the signaling effects are not clear;
and ii) the internationalization of norms is not sufficient to prevent atrocities.
165 A contentious but relevant example of the first type of impunity gap
mentioned herein is the proposed prosecution of former British Prime Minister
Tony Blair who engaged his armed forces in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. See
Twiggy Garcia, Tony Blair Should Be Prosecuted for War Crimes—Not Just
Judged by History, INDEPENDENT (May 7, 2014), http://www.the guardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/may/07/tony-blair-war-crimes-prosecuted-eel-like-boris162
163
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Example: Prosecuting ISIS at the ICC

Potential prosecution against the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria (“ISIS”) presents a tangible example as to how Context
consideration can alter the Court’s assertion of jurisdiction. The
argument presented below to prosecute ISIS would be analogous
to Comoros’s argument that the flotilla attack should be
considered in conjunction with attacks in the Gaza Strip, which
were outside the Court’s territorial jurisdiction. As a starting
point, we consider the ISIS attacks in Paris on November 13,
2015166 and in Brussels on March 22, 2016.167 France has been
an ICC State Party since July 18, 1998168 and Belgium since
September 10, 1998.169 The Prosecutor has taken the position
that she cannot investigate ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria, as its
leadership consists of Iraqi and Syrian nationals who are not
subject to the Court’s nationality jurisdiction.170 This is in spite
of the fact that nationals from State Parties have traveled to Iraq
and Syria, and have carried out attacks that can reasonably be
considered within the Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the
Prosecutor has taken the position that she cannot investigate
ISIS, as it falls beyond the Court’s nationality and territorial
jurisdiction.
As outlined in Part II, to prosecute ISIS leadership, nonState Party nationals who perpetrate attacks on both State and
non-State Party territories, the following criteria would have to
be fulfilled to proceed with an investigation under Context:

johnson.
166 Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994.
167 Lizzie Deardon, Isis Supporters Claim Group Responsible for Brussels
Attacks: ‘We Have Come to You with Slaughter’, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 22, 2016),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-supporters-claimresponsibility-for-brussels-attacks-bombings-belgium-airport-maalbeekmetro-we-a6945886.html.
168 State Parties to the Rome Statute: Western Europe and other States,
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/
the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited
Jan. 30, 2017).
169 Id.
170 ISIS Statement, supra note 19.
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ISIS attacks—whether directly by its leadership or (more
likely) through its subordinates—occur on State and nonState Party territories;
ISIS leadership resides in non-State Party territories and
members are nationals of a non-State Party(ies);
Attacks on State Party territories, taken in isolation, would
not reach the gravity threshold;
Aggregating the casualties and/or effects of ISIS attacks on
State and non-State Party territories would fulfill the
gravity threshold;
The State Party on the territory of which at least one ISIS
attack took place is unable or unwilling to prosecute the
perpetrators.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Taking as granted that the perpetrators of the Paris and
Brussels attacks are ISIS agents under the command and
control of ISIS leadership in Iraq and/or Syria, attacks by ISIS,
whether in France or Belgium or, otherwise, in Iraq or Syria,171
fall within the context of the same conflict. Nonetheless, only a
portion of the attacks took place within the Court’s territorial
jurisdiction.
Accounting for Context as framed herein, the OTP,
whether on its own accord or through the UN or a State Party,
can begin to collect information in relation to any of the attacks
listed above, whether or not committed on the territory of a State
Party. Comoros similarly argued that information relating to
attacks on both the flotilla and within the Gaza Strip as a result
of Operation Cast Lead can be collected. To prosecute ISIS,
temporal jurisdiction will not be an issue as both France and
Belgium signed the Statute well before the attacks on their
respective territories took place. However, territorial
jurisdiction may factor into whether the OTP ultimately decides
to commence an investigation and pursue prosecution against
ISIS leadership. Under traditional territorial jurisdiction, the
Atrocities in Iraq and Syria perpetrated by ISIS have been oftdocumented. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Annual Report, POL Index 10/2552/2016
(2016); The Persistence of History, ECONOMIST (Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.
economist.com/news/international/21661812-islamic-states-revival-slaveryextreme-though-it-finds-disquieting-echoes-across; Human Rights Watch: Iraq
Report, https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/iraq.
171
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OTP, as it has already deemed in its April 8, 2015 Statement,
cannot pursue ISIS leadership in Iraq and Syria. Under the fourphase process outlined in the OTP’s Policy Paper, evidence of
ISIS’s operations in Iraq and Syria would be discarded at either
Phase 1 or Phase 2, which are before the OTP can even consider
whether the attack meets the gravity requirement under the
Statute.
Limiting its preliminary examination to isolated attacks
in France and Belgium while ignoring the background of ISIS’s
operations and ongoing atrocities in Iraq and Syria, which have
included civilian executions, kidnappings, authorized rapes, and
the destruction of cultural property, would make it difficult for
the OTP to decide that ISIS’s attacks meet the requisite gravity
requirements to launch an investigation. This is especially true
given the relatively limited number of casualties as a result of
the Paris and Brussels attacks in comparison to other attacks
where the Court has determined sufficient quantitative gravity
for an investigation.172
Bifurcating information relating to ISIS’s attacks
between State Party and non-State Party territories would
obscure the sheer quantity of lives ISIS attacks have claimed.
The number of casualties has played a salient role in the
Prosecutor’s past decisions whether to initiate an investigation.
In his address to the Assembly of State Parties in November
2005, the Court’s first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, stated,
“[i]n Uganda, we examined information concerning all groups
that had committed crimes in the region. . . . Between July 2002
and June 2004, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was allegedly
responsible for at least 2200 killings and 3200 abductions in over
850 attacks. It was clear that we must start with the LRA.”173
Conversely, in his decision to initially not proceed with an

172 The Paris attack resulted in 130 casualties and the Brussels attack
resulted in 32 casualties. See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra
note 13; see also Brussels Attacks Death Toll Lowered to 32, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/brussels-attacks-deathtoll-lowered_us_56facaa4e4b0a372181b27ed.
173 Statement to the Fourth Session of the Assembly of State Parties by
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT. Nov. 28, 2005,
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ProsecutorMorenoOcampo_Opening_28Nov
05.pdf.
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investigation into potential war crimes committed by British
officials in Iraq, Moreno-Ocampo stated, “[t]he information
available at this time supports a reasonable basis for an
estimated 4 to 12 victims of wilful killing and a limited number
of victims of inhuman treatment, totaling in all less than 20
persons.”174
Despite criticism of the overly quantitative approach to
investigative selection, the OTP’s continuing policy appears to
be one that prioritizes situations with a larger number of
victims. As such, if quantity determines whether the OTP will
investigate a situation, a myopic bifurcated approach to
jurisdiction under the strict wording of the Statute ignores the
trans-territorial nature of modern conflicts where national
boundaries are being blurred and organizational policies may
exist across such boundaries. This reality is exemplified in ISIS’s
attacks in various States and non-State Party territories.
Considering Context when deciding whether to commence an
investigation into a situation is not only permissible but also
provides a better assessment of the true nature of a trans-border
conflict and whether it is a situation in which crimes under the
Court’s jurisdiction have taken place. Also, this expansive
approach would fall within the Court’s previous jurisprudence,
which prioritized relevance and probity of information when
determining whether to commence an investigation.
To conclude the ISIS example, traditional jurisdictional
parameters, as they currently stand, leave open an impunity gap
where potential perpetrators or criminal organizations that may
come within the Court’s jurisdiction are sheltered from
prosecution because the majority of their acts are committed

Letters to Senders re Iraq, Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT.
(Feb. 9, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FD042F2E-678E-4EC68121-690BE61D0B5A/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February
_2007.pdf. Kevin Jon Heller has argued, conversely, for ‘situational gravity’
where the OTP, rather than exclusively relying on numbers of casualties as in
the LRA and the Iraq examples above, should take a qualitative approach
focusing on the systematicity of crimes, their social alarm, and the level of
State involvement. He argues that “[i]nvestigating situations that involve
systematic and socially alarming crime but fewer victims would significantly
increase the likelihood that potential prosecutors would be apprehended and
prosecuted, thus increasing the deterrent value of those investigations.” See
HELLER, supra note 154.
174
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outside the Court’s strict territorial boundaries. If, for instance,
France and/or Belgium are unable or unwilling to investigate the
attacks as contemplated in Article 17 of the Statute, not only will
a decision by the Prosecutor to not investigate inhibit the Court
from prosecuting crimes in those States, but it will also
immunize criminal acts that have taken place by ISIS leadership
and functionaries within Iraq and Syria. The same argument
was applied by Comoros when arguing that not commencing an
investigation will immunize the flotilla attack and attacks in the
Gaza Strip. For ISIS, if the same organization is responsible for
criminal acts within France, Belgium, Iraq, and Syria, a full
contextual analysis aggregating information from attacks in all
those countries to meet the requisite gravity threshold will have
the potential for exacting punishment on ISIS’s leadership for
crimes within State and non-State Parties alike.
X.

Criticisms of Expansive Jurisdiction

The crux of my argument herein lies in the assumption
that the ICC should be a strong and robust Court with expansive
jurisdiction so as to close the impunity gap. Iontcheva,
conversely, has argued that a weaker Court that relies more on
national governments with more diverse perspectives and
greater acceptability by local populations is a better way to
achieve the goals of international criminal justice.175 She has
proposed four models of how to implement international
criminal law in the absence of a strong ICC: i) having the UN
create more ad hoc tribunals, such as the ICTY or ICTR; ii)
increasing the number of national prosecutions either under
international law or domestic human rights and war crimes
statutes; iii) asserting universal jurisdiction in domestic courts;
or iv) establishing mixed courts comprised of international and
national judges.176 Furthermore, her critiques of a strong,
centralized ICC include its lack of informed and diverse
perspectives, its inability to foster the internalization of

175 Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law:
The International Criminal Court as a Roving Mixed Court, 52 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 52 (2004).
176 Id. at 16-18.
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international norms leading to a backlash by local communities,
and its inability to promote post-conflict reconciliation as a
result of being far from the place where the crimes occurred.177
Needless to say, I disagree with any current proposal to
weaken the ICC’s jurisdiction in exchange for stronger domestic
courts or mixed courts, especially in light of the Court’s nascent
nature and increased membership since its inception. An
increasingly globalised world marked by greater instances of
cross-border conflicts between both rebel and State forces—
whether on the ground, in the air, through the water, or in
cyberspace—is precisely the reason why a strong and centralized
ICC with eventual universal membership will be more effective
at prosecuting current crimes and deterring future ones than a
weak and decentralized Court. I now tackle some likely
criticisms that may arise to the ICC’s proposed implementation
of Context.
a. Obviating State Sovereignty
The first potential criticism of the above expansive
approach is that investigating potential crimes within non-State
Parties that have not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction
infringes on territorial sovereignty. Critics of an expansive
approach to ICC jurisdiction will note that the ICC is a treatybased Court that requires a State to sign onto the Statute for its
jurisdiction to apply. Benzing characterized the primary
rationale for the ICC’s complementary jurisdictional framework
to be state sovereignty.178 While this criticism is valid and in line
with traditional conceptions of jurisdiction outlined in the
Court’s documents, there are other aspects of the Statute where
state sovereignty is compromised without a State’s consent. Two
specific instances of this are UNSC referrals and Article 12(3)
Declarations. Both of these mechanisms used to assert
jurisdiction can relate to non-State Parties, and in the case of
See id. at 20-21.
See Benzing, supra note 46, at 595 (“The most apparent underlying
interest that the complementarity regime of the Court is designed to protect
and serve is the sovereignty [,] both of State parties and third states.”); see also
Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Ct.,
GAOR 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22 (Doc. A/51/22), ¶ 155.
177
178
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Article 12(3) Declarations can swell the Court’s temporal
jurisdiction back to July 1, 2002.179 Furthermore, state
sovereignty is relegated in the general complimentary approach
to the ICC, in that the Court will step into the place of a national
jurisdiction if the latter is unwilling or unable to prosecute an
act in which there is a reasonable basis to believe it falls within
the Court’s jurisdiction. State sovereignty, even within the
traditional notions of jurisdiction, is not an absolute bar for the
ICC to extend its long arm into the domestic sphere.
There is, indeed, a political connotation to the Court
extending into territories that have not consented to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Powerful nations, such as the U.S. and China, that
have not signed on to the Statute will likely never have the Court
reach into its jurisdiction to prosecute individuals that they are
neither willing nor able to prosecute themselves. However, the
more likely scenario (if a contextual approach as argued here is
adopted) is that the Court may seek to extend its territorial
reach into those non-State Parties that do not exert as much
political influence, such as Iraq and Syria in the ISIS example
above. This may lead to selective prosecution, an already wellestablished criticism of a Court that has disproportionately
targeted prosecutions in African nations.180
The rebuttal to the selective prosecution criticism if
Context is accepted is that the prospect of selective prosecution
exists whether or not Context is adopted. The contention that the
ICC has adopted an Afro-centric approach to its prosecutorial
ambit has existed within its current jurisdictional confines
without a contextual approach. With an independent Prosecutor
armed with discretionary powers in addition to multiple avenues
of referral, one of which can be subject to veto by the UNSC, the
prospect of selective prosecution will always exist. However, as
argued here, the Court’s mandate is to close the impunity gap
and ensure those situations involving crimes at a mass scale
falling within its jurisdiction are brought before it. Only then

Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 12(3), 13(b).
See, e.g., Geoffrey York, Kenya and South Africa Shelve Protests
Against International Criminal Court, GLOBE AND MAIL (Nov. 26, 2015),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/kenya-and-south-africa-shelveprotests-against-international-criminal-court/article27503348/.
179
180
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can the Court unabashedly expand its jurisdiction through
Context despite the perennial prospect of prosecutorial bias.
As for the prospect of powerful nations, such as the U.S.
or China, having their nationals subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction under Context when they perpetrate attacks on
State Party territories, this contention is easy to rebut legally
but difficult at a political level. Legally, the ICC should assert
its jurisdiction objectively irrespective of a particular nation’s
political clout. While the U.S. may be able to hinder the Court’s
effectiveness if its nationals are investigated, this does not
change the legal permissibility under the Statute to apply
Context to cross-border conflicts. Admittedly, as a political
matter, it may be more prudent to attempt prosecuting ISIS
leadership, as opposed to Dick Cheney or Donald Rumsfeld, as
the U.S. could exert its political will on the ICC or, more likely,
its allies who are State Parties if either of those individuals are
considered for prosecution. Nonetheless, the political
ramifications of applying Context are beyond the confines of this
paper. I merely assert that there are legal justifications and
court precedents allowing for an expansive approach to temporal
and territorial jurisdiction.
b. Legalism vs. Activism
Judge Hersch Lauterpact of the International Court of
Justice wrote in 1961 that there are two possible judicial
approaches in either international or domestic law. The first
approach conceives a judge’s task to be primarily, if not solely,
confined to deciding the case at issue. The other approach
conceives it properly within a judge’s purview, in addition to
deciding the present case, “to utilise those aspects of it which
have a wider interest or connotation, in order to make general
pronouncements of law and principle that may enrich and
develop the law.”181 Commenting on this distinction, the ICJ’s
Judge Gerald Fitzmaurice exclaimed that while domestic courts
have national legislatures to fill the gaps in the law, there exists
no equivalent in international law. He wrote, “[t]he
G. Fitzmaurice, Hersch Lauterpacht, The Scholar as Judge, 37 B.Y.I.L.
1, 14 (1961).
181
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international community is therefore peculiarly dependent on
its international tribunals for the development and clarification
of the law, and for lending to it an authority more substantial
and less precarious than can be drawn from the often divergent
or uncertain practices of States.”182
Judges Lauterpact and Fitzmaurice’s comments could
rightfully be construed as arguing for the construction of a
coherent set of judicial decisions premised on precedent in order
to establish a coherent policy framework under which
international courts make decisions. However, more broadly, the
Judges’ comments also regard the scope of an international
judge’s decision-making powers and their ability to consider
wider context when rendering judgments. This is especially true
in Justice Lauterpact’s reference to the “wider interest and
connotation” that a judge can consider even though his or her
decision will pertain to the facts of a particular case. Those
writing after World War II, when the advent of international
courts took root, were aware of the nascence of international law
and the necessity to develop robust judgments capable of
precedential value.
A growing concern in international law is judicial
scope.183 For the purpose of this paper, while it may be within
the confines of the OTP’s responsibilities to consider Context
under its rubric of impartiality, independence, and objectivity
when considering whether to commence an investigation, a
justifiable criticism arises whether, and to what extent, judges
of the Court can step outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the
Statute in rendering a situation admissible before the Court,

182 Friedmann, supra note 1, at 143-44. “Of interest, after Friedmann
expounds on the efficacy of IMT, he notes that the unlikeliness of establishing
a permanent international criminal court “in an inevitably highly charged
atmosphere of retribution of the victors against the vanquished. . . . nor is such
a development at all likely in the foreseeable future. A draft Convention
establishing an International Criminal Court has no prospect of adoption.” See
id. at 145-46.
183
While there is scarce literature on judicial scope in international
criminal law, more has been written in the field of investor-state arbitration in
relation to the difference between arbitrators and judges. See, e.g., W. Michael
Reisman, Case Specific Mandates versus Systemic Implications: How Should
Investment Tribunals Decide?: The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture, 29 ARB.
INT’L 131 (2013).
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and/or subsequently utilizing contextual evidence to issue an
arrest warrant or convict an accused. While I concur with the
decisions from the ad hoc tribunals, the court emphasized that
the requisite elements of crimes must come within the Statute’s
strict territorial and temporal limitations to find an accused
guilty. However, the threshold enquiry of whether to commence
or authorize an investigation can account for Context according
to the herein doctrinal arguments.
The collective goal of the ICC and all States—whether or
not as members of the Court—should be to completely fill the
impunity gap such that all cases in which a domestic jurisdiction
is unwilling or unable to prosecute a matter where a reasonable
basis to believe crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have taken
place should be considered for ICC investigation. Relevant
contextual considerations can assist the OTP and Pre-Trial
Chamber to determine whether to proceed with such
investigations. Asking Pre-Trial Chamber judges to consider
Context does not prejudice an individual’s rights because i) at
the authorization stage there is no accused; and ii) at the arrest
warrant stage, even if there is a dispute as to whether the
alleged crimes meet the gravity threshold, there would still be
evidence that crimes within the Court’s strict jurisdiction have
occurred. Judges would not be politicized by considering Context
as it is not they who are choosing what situations to investigate.
Rather, if a matter is not referred by a State Party or UNSC, it
would be at the discretion of an independent Prosecutor who is
not precluded from prioritizing some situations over others.
Also, Context considerations would apply universally to all
potential situations irrespective of what region of the world the
conflict occurs.
c. Ambiguity vs. Certainty
Another potential criticism to the herein argument of
expanding the ICC’s traditional notions of jurisdiction to
consider Context is that by doing so the legal framework under
which the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber function will incorporate
an inordinate amount of uncertainty whereby there will no
longer be consistent criteria in jurisdiction and admissibility
analyses. This argument has some teeth, especially since part of
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a court’s processes and decisions are designed to establish
precedent to guide future decisions. Nonetheless, I am proposing
that the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber, in all situations
(irrespective of their referral mechanism) should consider
Context. By employing Context consistently for all potential
situations, the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber would be
recognizing the changing face of modern armed conflict that is
constrained by neither place nor time. The crimes within the
Court’s jurisdiction universally require some form of
organizational and policy-based conduct on the part of a
government or rebel apparatus, and at times such conduct
cannot be fully assessed without applying Context.
Proponents of legal certainty will inevitably tout that the
drafters’ intent when formulating the Statute was to not assert
jurisdiction over those States not party to the Court, except for
UNSC referrals and Article 12(3) Declarations. This position
advocates both for state sovereignty and the necessity for legal
certainty when drawing the Court’s jurisdictional boundaries.
While there is little doubt the drafters intended to limit
jurisdiction to the explicit parameters set out in the Statute,
they included open-ended terminology, such as ‘gravity,’
permitting the Court to expand its jurisdiction to adequately fill
the impunity gap. Both the Funnel Approach and gravity’s
inherent ambiguity allow for the OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber to
apply Context despite its lack of jurisdictional certainty.
XI.

Conclusion

On March 14, 2016, the United States Congress voted
unanimously that the atrocities committed by ISIS committed in
Iraq and Syria constitute genocide.184 Congress had adopted a
similar vote in 2004 with regard to acts in Darfur.185 After the
March 14 vote, Cameron Hudson, director of the Holocaust
Museum’s Centre for the Prevention of Genocide, stated, “one
184 See Michelle Boorstein, The U.S. House Just Voted Unanimously that
the Islamic State Commits ‘genocide.’ Now What?, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/03/15/the-u-shouse-just-voted-unanimously-that-the-islamic-state-commits-genocide-nowwhat.
185 Id.
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thing that has troubled me is that I know of no organized
government effort to investigate crimes committed.”186 Mr.
Hudson’s comment is not ill-placed.
The current legal framework concerning criminal acts
being committed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria are immunized from
prosecution. Any UNSC referral to the ICC would likely be
vetoed by Russia or even China; neither Iraq nor Syria have
signed onto the Statute for a State Party referral to be
legitimate. It is such an instance where the implementation of
Context by the ICC’s OTP and the Pre-Trial Chamber can play a
role in prosecuting ISIS crimes. The terrorist organization has
claimed responsibility for attacks in State Parties, including
France187 and Belgium,188 as well as in Turkey, a non-State
Party.189 *Aggregating the relevant and probative evidence from
all these attacks, plus those in Iraq and Syria, would inevitably
meet the gravity threshold. Context considerations would also
interpret the attacks—either inside or outside the Court’s
territorial jurisdiction—as being perpetrated by one criminal
enterprise with its leadership in Iraq and Syria and agents in
parts of Europe where attacks have taken place. Given France
and Belgium’s ratification of the Statute, the possibility
therefore exists to prosecute ISIS leadership for attacks both
inside and outside State Party territories. A similar approach
could be taken toward other organizations whose attacks
permeate state boundaries and occur over a prolonged period of
time. Although this innovative argument was presented by
Comoros, it was not settled by the Pre-Trial Chamber and thus
remains an open enquiry.
Id.
See Vivienne Walt, ISIS Claims Responsibility for Paris Attacks as
Arrests are Made, TIME (Nov. 14, 2015), http://time.com/4112884/paris-attacksisis-isil-france-francois-hollande/.
188 See Alissa J. Ruben et al., Strikes Claimed by ISIS Shut Brussels and
Shake European Security, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/europe/brussels-airport-explosions.html.
189 See Lizzie Deardon, Ankara Terror Attack ‘Ordered by ISIS to Cause
Political Instability and Delay Elections’, Turkish Prosecutors Say, THE
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 28, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/ankara-terror-attack-ordered-by-isis-to-cause-political-instability-anddelay-elections-turkish-a6711766.html.
186
187

69

HASSAN AHMAD - CONTEXT AT THE ICC (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Context at the ICC

10/27/2017 2:25 PM

201

I have argued here that the changing structure of modern
conflicts paired with the existence of a permanent Court with
expansive procedural mechanisms and open-ended admissibility
factors are ripe considerations to close the impunity gap. This
will serve to fulfill the Court’s mandate of prosecuting the most
serious crimes of international concern. While a unanimous vote
in Congress has little, if any, legal effect in its ability to render
punishment upon perpetrators of genocide or crimes against
humanity or war crimes, the ICC harbors the ability to enforce
its law upon international criminal actors.
In taking an expansive jurisdictional approach, I do not
contend that the Court, whether its judges or the OTP, should
overstep its judiciary bounds to become legislators or appease
powerful nations by pursuing some prosecutions over others. I
also do not contend that the Court has to change its current
conception of jurisdiction as laid out in the Statute. I merely
suggest that the jurisdictional framework necessary to close the
impunity gap already exists within the Statute, both
procedurally and textually. Until and when—if ever—the
Statute receives universal acceptance, an expansive approach to
jurisdiction will be required to adequately appreciate the nature
of cross-border and inter-temporal conflicts. Context will be most
useful when there is an attack on a State Party’s territory by an
organization operating out of a non-State Party that is on the
cusp of being of sufficient gravity for the OTP to commence an
investigation.
The potential for further criticism in that the Court lacks
utility because of its inability to prosecute the world’s largest
conflicts, or is selective in its prosecutions is real. Adopting an
expansive approach to jurisdiction, rather than a constricted
one, would aid the Court in fulfilling its complementary
mandate, and provide legal recourse where none has existed in
decades—or even centuries—past. The hope is that by applying
Context the Court will perennially resolve to fulfill its ambitious
mandate thoroughly in light of the evolving nature of conflicts.
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